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1.1 Introduction 
 Around the world each year, hundreds, thousands, and in some cases, tens of thousands 
of lives are directly and indirectly affected by revolutions and the violence which they spawn. 
(Gurr 1970) As central social control breaks down and violence erupts, many can be killed, and 
multitudes more can be displaced. (Tanter & Midlarsky, 1967) In one of the most salient of 
modern cases of revolutionary social impact, the ongoing Syrian Civil War was estimated in 
April 2016 to have cost a staggering 470,000 civilian lives in a conflict which threatens to 
proceed into its sixth year in 2017. (SCPR, 2016) According to the Syrian Center for Policy 
Research, since the outset of the Syrian Civil War in 2011, normal life has come to a screeching 
halt as child life expectancy among Syrians dropped by nearly 20 years in early 2016. While this 
conflict is certainly the most recognizable modern example of protracted revolutionary violence, 
it stands as only one of many examples of the deadly impact of revolution in the Middle East 
region. During the protests and resulting revolutions of the Arab Spring uprisings, displacement 
and death projections were maximized as civilian non-combatants and militaries clamored for 
national renewal, freedom, or for representation in the national politics of their states. (Amnesty 
International, 2015) Because of the great national impact of revolutionary violence, the identity 
of many states of the Middle East have been shaped as a result of revolutionary activity in the 
past 40 years. 
1.2 Thesis 
 While the causative factors, internal happenings, and ultimate conclusion of revolutions 
can be directly influenced by many factors, this study aims to analyze the influence of American 
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intervention and American foreign aid on the outcome of revolutionary violence. To what degree 
does American foreign intervention and aid to Middle Eastern countries experiencing 
revolutionary activity influence the outcome of revolution? Moreover, does fluctuation in aid act 
as an indicator of future American intention? When American aid is distributed for the purpose of 
developing good governance in a state, or US leaders decide to intervene in physical, diplomatic, 
or multinational ways, does it have a sufficient impact to stop the revolution or to increase 
overall national or regional stability? Once American leaders apply interventional pressure to 
attain a particular aim, do national leaders respond with reforms which conform to the outcomes 
that American leaders endeavored to achieve? Finally, to what degree are the orthodox 
assumptions regarding drivers for revolutions supported in modern cases of revolution? The 
provision of aid and the application of interventional forces by US leaders can have a great 
influence on the outcome of the unrest. (Alesina & Weder, 2002) (Taveras, 2001) The goal of the 
paper is to make considerable steps towards understanding the possible influence US 
intervention can and does exert on modern Middle Eastern revolutions, and to give a clear view 
of what other factors alter the outcome of revolutions.  1
 In this project, I hypothesize that American leaders likely use a variety of strategic tools 
in order to actively intervene in or influence the result of revolutionary activity. Furthermore, this 
intervention likely has played a significant role in supporting or causing the desired result of the 
intervention. Secondly, I hypothesize that foreign aid can and has been used as a strategic 
resource to constrain the interests of recipient states and their ruling regimes in cases of Middle 
 When speaking of revolutionary success, I refer to the ultimate aims of the revolution. In many cases, this aim is governmental 1
overthrow and replacement. I will refer to this as the ultimate aim of revolution.
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YEAR / REGION Aid to Tunisia (In 
Millions) Tunisia Annual Revenues
2012 $278,186,569,000 $2,306,179,059,696
2011 $91,517,090,000 $245,804,606,585,253
2010 $38,573,212,000 $228,686,626,809,813
2009 $25,939,200,000 $227,300,186,788,929
2008 $18,250,254,000 $240,622,059,781,429
2007 $18,716,456,000 $220,731,291,493,672
2006 $19,286,818,000 $215,919,223,708,366
2005 $24,634,002,000 $215,554,918,678,799
2004 $23,991,464,000 $217,768,222,662,787
2003 $12,259,074,000 $217,552,935,855,031
2002 $22,901,026,000 $224,792,559,496,672
2001 $19,755,944,000 $221,088,606,797,493
2000 $7,588,284,000 $212,822,342,268,882
1999 $4,521,161,000 $219,099,059,376,837
1998 $38,315,496,000 $220,114,386,982,439
1997 - $215,306,834,030,683
1996 $4,076,410,000 $231,211,082,685,717
1995 $3,309,599,000 $23,310,738,110,609
1994 - $247,260,710,765,841
1993 $15,356,128,000 $245,751,062,234,441
1992 $49,769,678,000 $238,478,955,780,501
AVERAGE $37,734,098,158 $206,261,075,712,090
NOTE: Reliable figures for Annual Revenues in 
Tunisia are unavailable for years outside of 
1992-2012
 1
YEAR / REGION Aid To Egypt (In Billions)
Egypt Annual 
Revenues
2015 $202,415,238 $170,426,511,814,177
2014 $190,320,541 $196,828,837,050,134
2013 $3,079,244,638 $186,290,066,645,509
2012 $2,989,165,630 $185,251,987,455,328
2011 $3,004,915,332 $218,615,116,857,285
2010 $3,303,074,245 $263,405,296,488,198
2009 $4,155,167,167 $245,606,923,506,421
2008 $3,530,048,430 $236,746,777,658,432
2007 $4,344,984,196 $241,034,482,758,621
2006 $3,685,568,607 $200,644,382,544,104
2005 $4,220,554,088 $199,565,217,391,304
2004 $4,933,252,345 $205,640,718,562,874
2003 $4,691,089,367 $195,447,347,585,115
2002 $5,750,539,330 $207,884,025,648,174
2001 $4,888,453,779 $216,483,387,239,047
2000 $2,747,499,754 $225,692,457,737,321
1999 $2,988,949,692 $23,033,925,539,318
1998 $4,051,017,206 $244,866,683,514,775
1997 $4,048,052,695 $240,178,727,114,211
1996 $4,254,244,802 $247,769,607,843,137
1995 $4,729,411,473 $268,925,714,285,714
1994 $3,714,830,179 $265,477,486,424,374
1993 $4,201,143,773 $257,541,337,167,505
1992 $4,805,451,083 $214,712,230,215,827
1991 $4,848,333,677 $162,788,761,706,556
1990 $5,358,597,592 $188,268,229,166,667
1989 $5,207,896,307 -
1988 $5,080,280,101 $186,485,436,893,204
AVERAGE $3,893,017,902 $210,948,580,622,716
NOTE: Reliable figures for Annual Revenues 
in Egypt are unavailable for years outside of 
1988-2015
 1
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Eastern revolution, and to bend them to the interests of American leaders. As revolutionary 
activity occurs, the increased provision of American funds can give recipient states the 
opportunity to invest in measures that would appease their revolting publics. By providing funds 
which may spur economic and humanitarian development, provide for an increased measure of 
judicial purity, or provide regimes with the opportunity to sell their successes to their publics 
through massive statewide PR campaigns, American foreign aid may give foreign governments 
the added resources they need in order to tip the balance of revolutionary activity in their favor. 
As American foreign aid increases, I hypothesize that state governments are able to establish 
good governance practices and stave off revolution in some cases by reform. In doing this, 
American foreign aid may reverse the national calamity which led to the initial revolt and aid in 
stabilizing national governments. By decreasing the initial drivers of revolution, later referred to 
as “Goldstone’s assumptions”, US foreign aid can head off revolutions before they develop fully. 
Furthermore, I hypothesize that when aid budgets are too politically sensitive, American leaders 
will intervene in more direct ways in order to shape the result of the revolution to their interests.  
 American foreign aid can be of great utility in aiding states in the completion of small 
development projects, inducing a greater level of military sophistication, and providing for an 
increased measure of judicial purity. However, the amount of aid that any state receives in 
comparison to national revenues from other sources or national GDP is marginal. For instance, in 
Tunisia, an important Middle East country which has received an amount exceeding $100 
Million USD for 34 of the last 62 years, American foreign aid comprised roughly .018% of total 
government revenues in the period of 1992-2012 (Prichard et. al., 2014) In the same way, in the 
time between 1988 and 2015, American aid to Egypt, a state which has historically enjoyed a 
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closer relationship with the US than most other Middle East states, represented only 1.84% of 
Egyptian revenues.  (Prichard et. al., 2014) More importantly than this, American foreign aid 23
can be used as a signaling mechanism which is used to alter foreign regimes’ actions to adhere to 
the preferences of American administrations. To a degree, the amount of American foreign aid 
that is given to a state is important, as often hundreds of millions, or in some cases, billions of 
dollars are given to recipient states each year. (USAID, 2016) This, however, is not as important 
to recipient states as what the provision of aid signals. American economic investment in a state 
can signal a great degree of American support for that state and it’s current practices. As 
American leaders increase the amount of aid given, it can be perceived by recipients as a signal 
of commitment and continued mutual interest. Likewise, when the US decreases the level of aid 
provided to recipient states as a result of contrived changes in recipient states or after revolts 
begin, American leaders signal to recipient states that the relationship which both have enjoyed 
in the past is being stretched dangerously. American leaders indicate by this action that 
continuing similar activity could result in a recalculation of American interest in favor of 
alternative investment. More than the removal of hundreds of millions of dollars from a 
recipient’s developing economy, the retraction of American investment in any state can mean 
more complex national issues in the future, and a decreased capacity to respond effectively to 
future revolt. State leaders know that frozen relations with the US can mean economic instability, 
increased diplomatic burden , and a lack of future support if popular revolt becomes more 4
 These figures represent the only years with available reliable data pertaining to annual revenues, and provide a roughly 20 year 2
span to represent a 30 year trend. 
 See VIS 1A3
 By diplomatic burden, I mean that states who perceive a state government as having been “kicked out of the fold” by the US will be 4
less apt to make concessions to a government which has been diplomatically exiled by the existing superpower. 
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protracted or unmanageable. In this way, the amount of foreign aid dollars that a state receives as 
compared to other metrics of national economic activity is of little consequence in comparison to 
the strategic situation it signals toward future relations with the US. As the US alters its aid 
provision policy in the context of peace or revolution, it signals to recipient states its approval or 
disapproval and alerts recipients to its intended future actions given the situation that the 
recipient state finds itself in. 
 One of the central goals of this study is to discover to what degree American foreign aid 
and intervention is influential in cases of revolution in the Middle East, and if there is a purpose 
for the further study of American interventional influence in strategically complex international 
situations. As a first movement, this study will analyze revolution as a product of the five well 
recognized revolutionary drivers. These drivers are: I. National economic or fiscal strain, II. 
Growing internal rivalry, III. Popular anger at injustice, IV. Presence of an ideologically shared 
narrative of resistance, V. Favorable international relations. In this project, I will focus on 
indicators of the three most tractable of these as indicators of the rest including national 
economic stability, alienation or political involvement of populace and elites, and growing sense 
of injustice and governmental illegitimacy, which will be referred to as good governance. As the 
literature supports, I suggest that states which begin to experience revolutionary activity may 
possibly reverse the initial effects of revolt by adjusting the drivers of the above mentioned 
variables. If this can be done, it follows that revolutions can be stopped before they begin.  
 In order to identify the impact of American intervention and foreign aid on revolutions in 
the Middle East, this project will analyze two cases of successful Middle East revolution and two 
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cases of unsuccessful Middle East revolution. This analysis will seek to identify what 
circumstances in the above categories precipitated revolt, how American leaders responded, and 
what the result of that response was. In order to identify American intervention, this project will 
analyze American leader rhetoric, physical intervention, and institutional attempts at influencing 
or manipulating the outcome of the studied revolutions. Secondly, I will conduct a thorough 
quantitative analysis of American foreign aid flows to the state studied, and will endeavor to 
identify if there were significant changes after the outset of revolution, and if those changes may 
have had strategic implications. This project’s central hypothesis stands that American 
intervention and aid can buy or induce good governance and development (Tarp & Hansen,
2014), and in so doing can change the outcome of revolutions to suit American interests. 
(Skarbek & Leeson, 2009) In order to identify significant changes in governance, this analysis 
will identify structural components of each state studied, and will measure in a broad sense the 
impact of these circumstances on public perception. Second, this project will identify attempts at 
American intervention and will endeavor to identify the preferred impact of this intervention. 
Finally, state leaders’ reactions will be analyzed to determine if American intervention 
successfully bought or induced the desired changes and whether these changes were sufficient to 
stop or the revolution or spur it forward. If successful revolution ensued, I will endeavor to 
separate out cases of sufficient reform and cases of insufficient reform in the final chapter of this 
work. 
1.3 Clarifications
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Prior to delving into the substantive elements of the project, it is important to give a brief 
overview of the strictures which bound this project and the logic that underlies them. The first is 
the choice of timeline. From the perspective of American foreign policy, the 1979 revolution in 
Iran provides a clear changing point for American foreign policy, and for how the US deployed 
its  resources  in  the Middle  East.  (Parvaz,  2014)  Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution in  Iran, 
America’s strategic positioning with states in the Middle East has been relatively consistent, even 
despite the tumult produced by the Arab Spring. As US-Iranian relations collapsed, US leaders 
determined to widen the array of states with which it was allied, and sought to maximize their 
wide influence in a variety of new spheres. Furthermore, the larger context of the Cold War gave 
Middle Eastern states great motive to give into American attempts at establishing deep economic 
and diplomatic ties, the effects of which are still strong today. With the ending of the Cold War 
less  than  a  decade  away,  American  leaders  were  able  to  turn  their  attention  to  shoring  up 
alliances with states around the region, and preparing for an era dominated by East-West trade 
and diplomatic relations.
Throughout this work, the term Middle East is used to describe the region for which the 
US Department of State’s Bureau of Near East Affairs has diplomatic and policy authority. This 
area generally includes the Arab states of North Africa, the Levant, the Gulf Region, and Iran. 
The significance of this region to US policy and diplomacy has been stated previously and the 
confinement of this area as a region of study represents an internally consistent policy preference 
and priority structure.  The term “MENA region” or “MENA” are commonly used acronyms 
which refer to the states of the Middle East and North Africa. In this work, the term MENA 
should be considered an equivalent to the term Middle East. 
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When this work references American foreign aid or foreign aid, it is used to describe loan 
and grant funds that are allocated for economic or military purposes by the Government of the 
United  States,  and  are  represented  in  the  official  record  of  the  United  States  Agency  for 
International Development.  This study makes no practical distinction between aid allocated for 5
development, political affairs, security, or infrastructure. The provision of American foreign aid 
allows recipient states to use other public funds for crisis purposes, as funds allocated to revolt 
response can be replaced by US aid funds in  national  budgets.  For  this  reason,  this  project 
analyses all forms of American foreign aid together, and makes no practical distinction between 
varied forms of aid.  In this  study,  American aid to international  organizations,  including the 
United Nations, and its agencies is excluded. While American aid which is channeled through 
these institutions can be effective in altering the outcome of revolution, allocation of funds given 
to  international  organizations  is  restricted  to  the  prerogatives  and  needs  of  the  international 
organizations  that  receive  them.  Furthermore,  it  is  incredibly  difficult  to  follow the  trail  of 
American funds to embattled regimes when it is sent through international organizations. Finally, 
this work will not look at aid given through intelligence services or agencies with clandestine 
operations.  While  analyzing  these  flows  would  inevitably  provide  intriguing  research,  the 
information  that  is  available  for  these  flows  is  limited  at  best,  and  often  not  available  to 
researchers  or  anyone  without  governmental  security  clearance.  (Rubin,  2007)  Accordingly, 
instead of providing a partial and likely incomplete assessment of these funds, it  is better to 
exclude them entirely unless or until a greater multitude of information is available.  6
 While this record is brought together and presented by USAID, this agency only provides roughly 6% of American foreign aid 5
annually, and was only established in 1961. This source represents American foreign aid flows from all of the providing agencies of 
the US Federal Government for the years referenced. See reference list for link to dataset.
 The US black budget in 2013 was $52.5 Billion.This includes agency budgets for CIA (14.7 Billion), NSA (10.4 Billion), and the 6
clandestine arm the DoD. This also includes an estimated $29 Billion budget for secret weapons development. Specific information 
pertaining to flows to American black budget dollars to foreign governments are unavailable at present. More information available: 
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/781719/tables.pdf
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1.4 Historical Context 
 In American diplomatic history, few events have undermined US Middle East strategic 
interests more than revolutions. (Johansen, 1980) (Snyder 1999)  Moreover, no single variety of 7
events has ended more governments, or caused massive national reshuffle as revolution has in 
the modern Middle East. (Gurr, 1970) In 1979, the Islamic Revolution of Iran saw the ousting of 
the Iranian President, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi despite his importance to US leaders and 
political elites, and despite US attempts to support his regime. (Bhagat, 1987) This revolution 
saw the expulsion of American aid and diplomatic apparatus from the state, and an Iranian 
movement towards theocratic authoritarian rule, despite the investment of billions of dollars of 
American development and American security support that preceded the revolution. (Viorst, 
1995) In the same way, the 2011 Egyptian revolution that resulted in the ultimate installation of 
authoritarian Abdel Fattah el-Sisi plagued the US as diplomatic relations broke down, social 
violence occurred, and diplomats fled the state in the first major break in American brokered 
Israeli-Egyptian peaceful relations since the 1978 Camp David Accords were signed.  (Reuters, 8
2011) Again, in 2015, after enjoying years of diplomatic and security relations, the US-backed 
Yemeni government of Abd Rabbuh Hadi was deposed, Hadi was forced into exile, and 
American diplomatic engagement in Yemen came to a screeching halt as the US embassy was 
 It should be recognized that the infrequency of revolutionary activity in the modern Middle East does nothing to make the study of 7
them unnecessary or less significant. To the contrary, its relative infrequency and history as a mode of great national and 
international change only serves to strengthen the significance of revolutions as an area of necessary study.
 The violence which resulted from the 2011 Tahir Square Revolution was followed by widespread economic and social unrest, and a 8
recalibration of Egyptian ability to pursue their interests and those of their allies. While both al-Sisi and his predecessor were 
authoritarian rulers, the overthrowing of the Egyptian government run by Hosni Mubarak greatly diminished the ability of US leaders 
to assert themselves effectively in an Egyptian context. 
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evacuated. (Hjelmgaard & Onyanga, 2015) In this case, rebels citing a new revolution, took over 
much of the government infrastructure and severely limited the ability of American leaders to 
influence national policy in the country. While social violence and upheaval of any kind threaten 
to upend American interests in strategically important states, revolutions in the Middle East have 
more often been the cause of this tumult than other types of social violence in the last 30 years.  9
For this reason, revolutions provide a lens through which to understand the development, 
implementation, and degradation of American interests abroad. Moreover, understanding 
possible causal factors which lead to revolutions allows for the development of policies which 
enable the attaining of national interests by both central and peripheral states in cases of possible 
revolution.  
 Since 1979, twelve popular revolutions in the Middle East have resulted in a complete 
overthrow of government rule and the purging of national institutions.  In that time, a further 10
nine attempted popular revolutions have resulted in marginal concessions being made to 
populations and political elites. While much is known about why revolutions happen, and how 
they transpire, woefully little is known about how other happenings impact the outcome of 
revolutions. (Walt, 1992) In every case of Middle East revolution since 1979, whether ultimately 
a case of successful revolution or not, significant changes have resulted economically, socially, 
and in terms of national governance. Most notably, during the violent revolutionary period 
known as the Arab Spring, twelve states across the Middle East experienced significant 
revolutionary activity which led to governmental change, leaving only five Arab states in the 
 See Visualization 1B9
 See Visualization 1A10
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Middle East untouched. Moreover, during this period, among the twelve states that experienced 
revolutions, half experienced a complete overthrow or replacement of their governments. In five 
additional states, revolutionary activity produced significant changes in national governing 
structure, and one became a case of protracted civil war. In the coming pages, I will endeavor to 
show that revolutions in the Middle East since 1979 have been developmentally significant for 
the states which have experienced them as well as the region as a whole. (Jones, 2012) I will 
further show that revolutions are uncommon, (Goldstone, 2011) and that the Middle East has 
been an area of relative stability during the last 30 year; a conclusion that threatens to overturn 
perceptions of the Middle East among academics, political pundits, and policymakers.  
1.5 Theoretical Framework 
 As a first step towards deriving a comprehensive understanding of the dynamics of the 
Middle East and its revolutions, one must answer the question, “Does American foreign aid 
precipitate revolt?”. After a deep analytical look at the preceding literature on foreign aid, it is 
clear that unilaterally foreign aid is an insufficient force to produce revolutions. It is clear that it 
can however make its success more possible and in some cases might inadvertently purchases its 
success. Revolutions represent a complex socio-political clashing of conflicting interests and 
national dynamics. “Revolutions do not arise simply from mounting discontent over poverty, 
inequality, or other changes. Rather, revolution is a complex process that emerges from the social 
order becoming frayed in many areas at once (Goldstone,2014).” As revolutionary activity 
increases, national populations clamor for their interests to be heard and heeded by the loudest 
political voices of their nation. Their threat, if disregarded, is that their action will turn from 
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protest and unrest to full revolution wherein governments are overthrown and institutions are 
ransacked. While American foreign aid does certainly play a role in the complex dealings 
between foreign governments and their enraged, revolting populations, it is necessary to make 
clear under what circumstances foreign aid does have an impact and to what extent it does. To 
say that the application of American foreign aid always causes a particular outcome would be 
wrong, as revolutions and cases of other social unrest do not necessarily share a common causal 
stem. (Skarbek & Leeson, 2009) In reality, revolutions are highly complex socio-political events; 
their causes can be many and contingent on interactions among them.(Gottschalk, 1944)  
 When the US gives aid or intervenes in the circumstances of states which are 
experiencing revolt, it does this, in part, to assure the stability of governments who support 
American national interest. (Savun & Tirone, 2012) In other cases, American intervention and 
aid is withheld or restricted from states whose governments American leaders prefer to see 
reform or collapse, as was the case in Egypt after the military coup d'état of 2013. (US Budget, 
2012) In cases of domestic upheaval, national governments may use US aid to buy off political 
elites’ allegiance, to suppress dissenters, or to develop national infrastructure in order to pacify 
their publics. In cases where the US withholds necessary aid, this could inhibit the recipient state 
from paying off elites, investing in development projects, and thus pacifying their local 
populations. (Knack, 2001) However, when the US increases aid, it can enrich political leaders, 
secure unpopular leaders in office (by co-opting elites), or allow for deeper misuse of funds. 
(Winters, 2010) The ability of elites and the public to see this transaction could further inflame 
an already negative public image of the government and may serve to increase the fervor and 
determination of revolutionary parties to achieve their aims. This could serve to motivate 
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disinterested members of the public towards revolutionary activity as the claims of 
revolutionaries are made more salient to the mass public. In this way, increases in American aid 
or intervention may serve to increase the likelihood of successful revolution. As rulers who are 
perceived as corrupt or self-interested receive more aid and are supported by US leader rhetorical 
or physical intervention, it may provide leaders with the opportunity to further misuse national 
resources and oppress their publics, thus deepening the distrust of elites and the public for the 
leader. In this case, the only opportunity that a state leader may have to stave off revolution will 
be to to use interventional resources to quickly reform and develop the state institutions before 
the revolutionary group that plagues their state gets too large and powerful. Often, however, state 
leaders refuse to make deep, meaningful reforms until revolters have nearly won, 
underestimating their resolve, or thinking their government is too strong to fall.  
 American intervention is often highly influential, sometimes positively and sometimes 
negatively, in the success or failure of revolutions in the states of the Middle East. The ability of 
a national government to return from the brink of full revolution depends centrally on two 
factors. 1) Timing - as revolting groups increase in their size and complexity, their ability to 
effectively resist their national government increases. Eventually, if government changes are not 
made in favor of the demands of revolters, the revolting masses will gain enough internal 
structural stability and control to topple the national government and translate their popular 
unrest to complete government overthrow. Until a certain tipping point, the government may 
have the capacity to give selective concessions to revolters in favor of preserving the lives and 
freedom of rulers, and to avoid a complete revolution. If, however, the national government 
waits too long to give concessions towards stability, legitimacy, and representativeness, because 
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it feels that it either shouldn’t have to, or because it does not realize the revolters’ popular 
support and its eventual ability to seize control. The goal of any ruler must be to give early 
metered concessions before the revolters realize that they could take control of the state away 
from its leaders. Secondly, Caliber - if a government recognizes a need to give concessions 
towards stability, legitimacy, or representativeness and refuses to do so, or decides to do so too 
late, revolters will likely gain popular support, become more violent, and collect small victories 
which will slowly degrade the ability of rulers to govern and control their state legitimately. If a 
leader gives insufficient concessions, unrelated concessions, or no concessions at all, revolts can 
turn to revolutions and quickly overturn national governments, as was the case in a number of 
MENA states during the Arab Spring.  11
 In endeavoring to discover the relationship between revolutionary activity and American 
intervention and aid, the question must be answered: if American intervention affects the success 
of revolutions, what is it producing or buying and what impact does it have on the recipient 
nation? In order to answer this question, one must understand what it is that national publics are 
most often interested in. As Jack Goldstone outlines, revolt is founded in public concern for their 
representation, their stability, and their role in the political apparatus of their nation. (Goldstone, 
2014) As national leaders allow economic instability to grow, and political alienation to increase, 
the balance of contentment shifts and popular desire for forced change increases. In his work, 
Goldstone lays out a set of five key factors that have been shown to lead to revolt or 
revolutionary activity. Individually, these characteristics may not be powerful enough to spawn 
 See Visualization 1C11
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massive popular revolt, but brought in tandem with one another, these factors have led to 
revolution in a large number of cases.  
 The first characteristic that Goldstone references is economic and fiscal strain.  This is 12
typically conceived of as a calculation of foreign investments, corporate tax rate, consumer tax 
rate, domestic job growth, and inflation. As state leaders mismanage financial resources, states 
are required to increase taxes in order to drive further economic stimulus. This also results in the 
need to cut spending to important areas of the economy, which can inflame tensions as 
individuals and institutions are required to tighten already thin budgets. This can easily cause 
discontentment and further the frustrations of political elites, whom leaders are dependent on to 
pacify national publics. The second characteristic is a growing alienation of elites. Political 
leaders require the support of these individuals in order to convince the public to support the 
regime in power. (Gurr, 1970) If national elites feel as if their opinion is not heard or if they feel 
their political influence is waning, “they may decide to overturn and replace the existing social 
order, rather than merely to improve their place in it (Goldstone, 2014).” The third characteristic 
is a widespread popular anger about injustice. This is often seen when impoverished people 
experience rent or taxes increase, or when the working class are unable to find gainful 
employment. “When these groups feel their difficulties are the result of unjust actions by elites or 
rulers, the will take risks of joining in revolts to call attention to their plight and demand 
change.” (Goldstone, 2014) This often results in groups of people joining together in protests and 
marches in order to show their distain for the current system. 
 While taxation bureaucracies in the state of the Middle East are often inefficient and uneven in their taxation, specific figures are 12
available for taxation for each state studied in the case studies section of CH. 2. 
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 As popular unrest grows and elites begin to mobilize popular frustration, the fourth 
dynamic comes into clear view. Elites begin to bridge the gaps between their frustrations, the 
frustration of common individuals, and the frustrations of common individuals as a group. 
(Goldstone et. al., 1991) This process creates a shared narrative of resistance and represents the 
final movement towards significant revolutionary activity. As individuals and small groups of 
people realize that their experiences and frustrations are shared among a larger minority of 
individuals or among a majority of individuals, these large groups join together to showcase their 
anger. As publics do this, they are are spurred on by elites who lead the frustrated masses to 
believe that their goals are attainable. The final movement towards total revolution requires 
favorable international relations. As small groups of individuals band together in protest of poor 
national situations, states with interest in preservation of the status quo for the revolutionary state 
commit to not intervene in the revolution against the revolutionary group and further commit that 
they will throw their support behind the post-revolutionary government in the interest of 
protecting and furthering their own interests.  
 The above factors, which I will hereafter refer to as Goldstone’s assumptions are the 
epicenter of revolutionary activity, and can alternatively be referred to in whole as bad 
governance. As the presence of these characteristics becomes more obvious, the condition within 
state descends towards revolt. As is clear in the mapping of Vis. 1C, state leaders have a number 
of opportunities to adjust and pacify their publics with reforms that fall short of regime 
overthrow. However, if leaders are sufficiently distanced from the frustrations of their publics, if 
their reforms are insufficient to pacify their publics, or if they refuse to reform, thinking that the 
revolt will pass on its own, the revolution will build steam and will certainly threaten the stability 
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of their regime. VIS. 1C lays out the specific junctures at which state governments are able to 
influence revolutionary activity and gives the logical conclusions to varied actional preferences 
on the part of the state government. As this is a conversation about external influence on internal 
revolution, what remains is to explain at which junctures foreign economic intervention can be 
influential.  13
 The question which remains is how American intervention might be able to induce or 
purchase these stabilizers in cases where their absence has caused massive revolt. As revolters 
gain popular support against rulers who have allowed institutional control to be slowly 
centralized, slowly raided national treasuries to enrich themselves or to invest in fruitless 
endeavors, or subverted national laws and courts, rulers have the opportunity to introduce 
reforms that fall short of complete institutional overhaul. At critical junctures, American signals 
of support to rulers in peril may provide these leaders with the physical resources needed to 
pacify or resist their publics, or with the assurance that their rule is secure under the watch of a 
willing interventionist American foreign policy. It may also provide leaders with the opportunity 
or motive to invest in new reforms to the judiciary of their government and the appointment of 
special prosecutors in order to root out corruption. Furthermore, the provision of aid gives the 
government the opportunity to create jobs, stimulate stagnant economic sectors, and to promise 
otherwise allocated money to important groups and agencies that will help to suppress the 
popular outcry in their state. American support and aid can temporarily provide the perception of 
legitimacy of governments by providing reliable and trustworthy surrogates who can affirm the 
legitimacy of the national government, and provide it the tools to maintain its power. Finally, aid 
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can buy perception of representativeness by allowing national rulers to advertise the ways in 
which they are representative. By giving the opportunity to purchase the support of public 
relations firms, and to do media campaigns aimed at convincing national publics that their 
government rulers represent them. In this way, American foreign aid can be used to inject a sense 
of stability, legitimacy, and representativeness into governments and stave off political collapse. 
1.6 Theory of Revolt - External Motivation for Intervention 
 As states in which the US has interest begin to experience the results of bad governance, 
the US often analyzes its strategic capacities to influence the revolutionary activity to fit its 
interests. (Fitzsimmons, 2008)  As anti-government protest increases, the American policy 14
apparatus performs a strategic calculation of the cost/payoff of intervention and endeavors to 
assess the most reliable variety of intervention for the situation at hand. If it is determined that 
the upheaval is sufficiently potent to cause regime change, American policy leaders calculate 
whether it is in their interest to respond in order to affect the outcome of the upheaval. US 
strategic calculation allows for a varied response which includes military, economic, and political 
responses. As the US determines the appropriate step, whether to restrict funding to the national 
government or to increase it, to increase support to revolutionary groups, or to turn its back on 
both groups, the US makes a strategic decision to inject itself into the national politics of the 
state in order to restore order to a degree that satisfies US interests. The central goal of American 
administrations towards the Middle East in the last twenty years has been the development of 
effective governance in recipient states and the exportation of democracy to authoritarian states. 
(Fitzsimmons, 2008) As the effects of American involvement is realized, a final foreign policy 
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internal response is actualized in order to readjust to new strategic realities, and to update 
expectations for future interactions with the revolutionary state. It is not clearly known, however, 
what the impact of American intervention is on revolutions. When the US gives $20 billion in aid 
to Egypt, is it actually able to buy better governance and representation for minorities? Does 
American aid provision lead to a greater investment in economic or human development which 
allows for a greater perception of legitimacy or good governance? Does intervention to support 
or oppose a totalitarian regime result in increased democratization or good governance? The 
answers to these questions are what wait to be uncovered in the subsequent chapters.  
1.7 History of Intervention and Revolution 
 In the year 1979, the Islamic Revolution in Iran entirely reordered the geopolitical 
structure across the Middle East region, and showed that mass-revolution could be used as a tool 
by a populace to attain their national political goals by recusant means. (Singh, 2011) While the 
1979 revolution in Iran was not the first major revolution in the modern era of the Middle East, it 
was significant in two ways. First, the 1979 revolution significantly brought into question the 
capacity of foreign powers to assert their wills on weaker powers of the Middle East. As Iranian 
protestors forced off the assertive influence of the United States in their national and 
international affairs, they made a proclamation to their allies, friends, and neighbors that 
American ability to supersede national interest, culture, and religion was not as universal as it 
was once thought to be. (Hunter, 1988) In as much a way as it caused the United States to 
reassess its ability to influence other states around the world, (Wise, 2011) it gave states around 
the world, and elements of their politically involved populations cause to question the future role 
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of the United States in their national political discourse. Secondly, the 1979 revolution in Iran 
showed that intransigent national policies could be forced to change at the hands of a sufficiently 
motivated and powerful populace, in even the most well organized states. In the course of just 
over a month, protestors and their leaders were able to topple a well-organized government 
which was backed by the modern world’s only existing super power. The introduction of these 
concepts into the minds of politically motivated and influential individuals in states around the 
Middle East had the capacity to catalyze revolutionary violence across the Middle East. 
(Saghieh, 2015) As populaces sought a new means of attaining their hopes, revolution presented 
a newly proved means of forcing political leaders to pay attention to the plight of marginalized 
populations. (Wise, 2011) 
 Considering the radical change that it precipitated, one would expect that the 1979 
revolution would act as a catalyst for similar subsequent revolutions among the weaker states of 
the Middle East. Armed with the awareness of the possibility of revolutionary contagion in the 
Middle East (Goldstone, 2014), as happened after the uproar in Tunisia began in 2011, one could 
expect that the revolution in Iran would also start a wave of similar revolutionary activity. 
Moreover, one would expect that this activity would persist throughout the following decade, 
much as the revolutions of the Arab Spring did only 32 years later. Despite what appears to be an 
intuitively reasonable projection of events, the following years across the Middle East were years 
of relative stability.  Despite the high probability of revolutionary contagion to neighboring 15
countries, and the happening of revolution in seven Middle Eastern states in the last half-decade, 
revolution has been rare. By numerous metrics, the states of the Middle East have been relatively 
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free of revolutions even despite the massive upheaval which resulted from the Arab Spring 
revolutions. (Goldstone, 2014) As such, the Middle East is not entirely distinct from the rest of 
the world, in that revolutions are generally uncommon happenings around the world. (Walt, 
1992) Since before the 1979 revolution and thereafter, the Middle East has been perceived by 
many in the West as the quintessential tinderbox (Bowles, 1957), where restless populations are 
waiting for their window of opportunity to fight against the governments that constrain them. 
(Great Decisions, 1970) The inability of the 1979 revolution to produce regional contagion or 
even less major revolutionary events in neighboring states which share similarities in population 
and popular ideology is striking to this conception. The lack of revolutionary activity in the 
Middle East paints a clear picture of the Middle East as a series of relatively stable countries 
which are growing through ethnic divisions and political development in quite a stable fashion. 
(Goldstone, 2014) This lack of revolutionary activity shows that a view of the Middle East as a 
region of significant upheaval must be more rigorously analyzed. 
1.8 Foreign Aid and the Middle East 
 Few regions of the world since World War II’s reconstructive Marshal Plan have enjoyed 
continued American economic provisions as consistently as the Middle East has in the past 70 
years. In the year 2012, the Middle East region received roughly $18 Billion of US foreign aid, 
totaling 27% of all US foreign aid disbursements for the year, whereas Europe, South and 
Central Asia, and the Western Hemisphere received only 12% collectively. (USAID, 2016) When 
combined with the aid disbursed to neighboring Arab Islamic Afghanistan and Pakistan during 
the same year, the proportion of American economic aid to the region during 2012 was over 
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30%. Moreover, the Middle East has enjoyed this high proportion of American foreign aid for the 
majority of the last 30 years. “Foreign aid first became an important tool of American national 
security policy under the Truman administration. The first great foreign aid program, the 
Marshall Plan, was aimed at rebuilding Western Europe after World War II, in part as a bulwark 
against Soviet expansion. (Radelet, 2003)” In the time since the Marshal Plan, American 
economic aid has been used to motivate political allies towards cooperation with American 
interests, to support revolutions and counter-revolutions, and to support good governance 
policies in recipient states. As foreign aid was applied and reapplied to differing circumstances, 
the American foreign policy apparatus has learned the cases in which American foreign 
economic aid is effective at gaining quiescence with American interest and when it was not. As a 
massive trial-and-error strategy since 1979, policy leaders in the US have realized that the utility 
of American aid dollars is much broader than simple development. (Morgenthau, 1962) 
  In fact, aid is entirely useful for the purpose of motivating foreign governments to act or 
not act in a particular way. (Knack, 2001) Often in the last forty years, aid has been used by 
donors to incrementally strengthen governance in recipient states such as Bolivia and Egypt 
(Carothers & De Gramont, 2013), have been used to pacify publics, as was the case after the 
Zambian economic collapse in 2008, (Savun & Tirone, 2012), and in changing the method of 
governance to be more democratic in some states. (Carothers & De Gramont, 2011) It is my aim 
to identify whether it is useful for the purpose of encouraging revolutionary action or suppressing 
it, and for buying allies and marginalizing others. (Baldwin, 1969) As states have experienced 
difficulty, the strategic utility of economic foreign aid has increased drastically. (Bearce & 
Tirone, 2010) Whether seen as a motivator of development, an encouragement of resistance, or a 
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supporting of good governance, foreign aid can be used as a means of coordinating and 
supporting the result that most closely corresponds to American national interests. (Carothers & 
De Gramon, 2013) 
1.9 Implications 
 Apart from being an interesting theoretical topic, understanding Middle East revolutions 
promises to bolster American foreign policy and America’s ability to attain goals which support 
American national interest. If revolutions and their causes are deeply understood, one can make 
assertions regarding how to encourage or discourage them, and how to better the chances that 
publics will be represented and not oppressed by their governments in the future. As the 
American foreign policy apparatus grows in its understanding of the impact of American moves 
in the context of revolutions, we can begin to uncover what may be trusted to stave off 
revolutions that would otherwise be inevitable. As American foreign policy comes into a new era 
when the Middle East is central to some of our most important strategic US interests, an ability 
to track with a high degree of certainty when revolutions might or might not happen, and what 
strategic moves will effectively bring them to be or keep them from happening allows American 
leaders to protect American national interest and further them in a more comprehensive way. 
 In the area of international relations, few areas of policy have been studied as heavily as 
revolutions. Through a study of the underlying causes, impacts, and motivations of involved 
actors, academic models have been developed that have helped policy-makers more accurately 
predict when a revolution might happen, and what might lead to an increased likelihood of 
revolutionary activity. However, since revolutionary activity in the Middle East over the last 
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decades has been relatively rare, it is apparent that there is a significant need for a deeper 
understanding of what motivates revolutions. While models exist that help to understand 
revolutions, few use American foreign aid to understand what may happen. Furthermore, little 
study has been done on the possible impact of American aid and intervention on the national 
policies of recipient states and their populaces. Since 1947, the US has given an annual average 
of just under 11 billion dollars of aid to the Middle East, and in some years has given as much as 
33.7 billion. Over the last 70 years, this represents a greater consistent foreign aid investment 
than in any other region of the world.   As American investment continues into the 21st 16 17
Century, having a dynamic understanding of our national investment is key. (Schraeder et. al., 
1998) As policy makers make the decision to strategically invest American financial and 
strategic resources into states experiencing revolution, there should certainly be an awareness of 
the possible impacts of that investment. Furthermore, more understanding is needed pertaining to 
what impacts American strategic actions have on the likelihood of revolutionary success, the 
outcome of revolutionary activity, and how the US foreign policy apparatus can better respond to 
revolutionary activity. (Bearce & Tirone, 2010) By analyzing cases that are similar in their 
historical locus, their cultural dynamic, and the variety of American aid that they mutually enjoy, 
this analysis promises to shed light on the impact of American aid allocation. Moreover, it will 
allow for future research into the broader impacts of economic aid on cases of revolution and 
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 American foreign aid to Israel since it formally began in 1952 has been a great part of American foreign aid to the MENA region. 17
When averaged together, American aid to Israel has comprised an average of 40.045% of all aid to the region. While this sum is 
considerable, it does not weaken the claim of the importance of the Middle East to American policy makers. If anything, it serves to 
shrink the focus of American interest in the region to some degree. In the following portions of this work, I do not make any 
assertions of comparative value of states to US interest, I present the states as standalone recipients of aid. Israel is important to 
US interests, and as a Middle Eastern state, their unilateral interest to the US bolsters the importance of the region as a whole.
   of  33 136
give the opportunity for models to be created wherein interventional impact can be charted and 
planned for in advance of revolutionary activity. 
1.10 Ground Map
In  the  subsequent  chapters  of  this  work,  I  will  lay  out  four  cases  of  Middle  East 
revolution and analyze the circumstances that precipitated revolt. I will endeavor to analyze the 
factors that lead to revolt, what spurred the revolt forward, and ultimately what the outcome was 
of the revolution. As a second movement, I will superimpose an analysis of American aid flows 
and intervention to the countries of interest on this analysis, will endeavor to uncover trends in 
aid  and  intervention,  and  will  connect  them to  their  effects  on  the  ground  in  the  countries 
experiencing revolution. In order to do this, I will analyze aid flows as they are reported in the 
US State Department Greenbook as well as the official record of US foreign aid flows released 
by the US Agency for  International  Development.  Furthermore,  I  will  identify forms of  US 
intervention  which  were  exerted  once  revolt  had  begun  in  each  case,  and  will  endeavor  to 
uncover the impact of that intervention.
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2.1 Case Study Structure
Since the Islamic Revolution swept through Iran in 1979 and started a redistribution of 
regional power and influence in the Middle East, a number of impactful Middle East revolutions 
have occurred. With a keen eye towards the availability of this information, I chose 4 cases of 
Middle Eastern revolutions both inside and out of the broadly impacting Arab Spring revolutions 
of  2000-2016.  These  cases  include  Syria’s  failed  Hama Islamist  revolution  of  1982  against 
longtime ruler Hafez al-Assad, Egypt’s successful Arab Spring revolution of 2011 which deposed 
decades-long  strongman  Mubarak,  Iran’s  successful  1979  Islamic  Revolution,  and  Libya’s 
successful Arab Spring revolution which deposed Muammar Gaddafi. While each of these cases 
has a unique causal structure and had unpredictable consequences, they share a similar trajectory. 
In  each  of  the  chosen  cases  of  revolution,  national  publics  rose  up  to  protest  oppressive, 
undemocratic rulers to whom those publics assigned responsibility for their economic, social, or 
political dilemmas. Furthermore, their position in history stretches across a nearly 35 year swath 
of Middle East modern history. For this reason, there is a stronger likelihood that reliable case 
data will be available for each of the cases. 
As mentioned in Chapter One, aid is useful because it can provide billions of American 
dollars to nations which depend on outside funds in order to develop their economies, secure 
their borders, respond to humanitarian crises, and in some cases to suppress their populations and 
buy off elites.  Furthermore,  in times of crisis,  American intervention on behalf  of embattled 
leaders can confer a temporary sense of legitimacy upon ruling leaders, which can help in turning 
the tide of domestic turmoil. In the forthcoming portion of this work, I will endeavor to survey 
four cases of modern Middle East revolution and identify pre-revolutionary contributing factors 
in  areas  of  national  economy,  politics,  judiciary,  and  military.  Furthermore,  I  will  make  a 
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comparative analysis of the surveyed nations against other nations in the same region, and will 
endeavor to give context to the initial drivers of revolution. Thereafter, I will endeavor to make 
explicit the history of governance, economic growth, and judicial reform in each case, as this will 
provide an analytic clarity regarding latent expectations that national publics might have had 
prior  to  the  outset  of  revolution.  Finally,  I  will  make  quantitative  assessment  of  American 
responses in aid,  rhetoric,  institutional influence,  and physical  interventional measures to the 
revolutions. In this, I will seek to understand in a complex way how American leaders sought to 
influence and manipulate the conclusion of revolutions, and what the impacts of those endeavors 
were. 
In each of the forthcoming case studies,  I  will  present the historical  information that 
underlies each case. Second, I will analyze the national economic circumstances which preceded 
each revolution,  and the changes which might have had a part  in motivating the revolution. 
Third, I will analyze the social dynamics of the case studies, and will seek to identify if there 
were significant changes in the social order of each country prior to the revolution. I will then 
look at judicial governance and will try to identify whether there was widespread distrust or 
frustration relating to the judiciary and public opinion relating to corruption. I will then give a 
clear overview of America’s foreign aid prior to the onset of revolution, how it changed after the 
revolution,  and  what  might  have  driven  those  changes.  I  will  analyze  other  forms  of  US 
involvement,  as  mentioned  before,  and  will  endeavor  to  identify  in  what  ways  US  leaders 
injected their preferences into the national revolutions of recipient states. Finally, I will assess 
how national leaders responded to revolutionary activity prior to their demise or success. This 
case  structure  will  provide  a  clear  and  broad-reaching  framework  through  which  it  will  be 
possible  to  analyze  the  validity  of  Goldstone’s  assumptions  and  to  identify  the  impacts  of 
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American  preference  over  revolutions.  While  these  driving  factors  of  revolution  are  well-
established in revolution literature, it is not clear whether each are of equal importance to the 
onset  of  revolution,  or  whether  a  calculated response by national  leaders  has  any consistent 
positive or negative impact on the outcome of the revolt. I suggest that the most salient features 
of pre-revolutionary instability, or ones which impact people most directly, will function most 
powerfully as drivers of revolution, and that national leaders’ efforts to provide late reforms will 
be of little impact to the onset of revolution.
Regarding foreign aid, I  will  show how aid functions as a signal of US intent which 
indicates  the  approval  or  disapproval  of  American national  leaders  over  turmoil  in  recipient 
states. When states become recipients of American aid, American leaders signal to those foreign 
leaders  that  to  some degree they support,  or  if  nothing else,  are  complacent  regarding their 
governing of the recipient state. As such, once a recipient state has received aid consistently for a 
considerable amount of time, leaders can expect that aid to continue, barring any great changes 
in  the  calculations  of  American  leaders.  In  situations  wherein  recipient  states  experience 
revolutionary turmoil, once American leaders have exhausted other non-punitive strategies aimed 
at encouraging national reform in recipient states, American leaders may alter their response to 
include responses aimed at indicating the severity of the situation in recipient states. These costly 
signals  may  include  official  statements  supporting  protestors’ rights,  the  supporting  of  UN 
sanctions, or the decrease of foreign aid to the recipient state. These measures allow for a clear 
signal  of  intention  to  be  relayed  to  the  recipient  state  that  reform  is  essential,  without 
compromising the integrity of a longstanding relationship. t As the US pulls its aid, it sends a 
signal to the recipient state that the rest of the relationship is in jeopardy if it continues along its 
current path. Ultimately, what I am studying is the impact of American relations with foreign 
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nations, and what the US does in cases of revolutions. Foreign aid is an interesting lens to do this 
through though. In any national calamity, it is essential to understand the driving components and 
indicators of changes in the world. A better understanding promises of this promises to allow a 
clearer understanding of the mechanical happenings prior to the success or failure of revolutions.
This work will analyze a varied selection of American foreign intervention on cases of 
revolution.In this  work,  I  will  analyze American interference in three broad categories:  first, 
foreign aid, as this is an underlying focal point of this study. Second, I will analyze rhetorical 
interference. This will include presidential, diplomatic, and congressional statements of approval 
or disapproval of happenings and leaders before and during revolutions. Finally, I will analyze 
direct intervention, including the imposition of no-fly zones, troop deployment to regions, and 
the imposition of economic sanctions. This broad view will allow for a holistic approach towards 
the  possible  impacts  of  American  intervention  generally,  and  the  impact  of  foreign  aid 
specifically on revolutions. Based on the theoretical support of this work, it seems likely that 
American foreign intervention will share a strong relationship with the success or failure of the 
revolution. While it  is not clear whether the impact of American intervention is sufficient to 
dictate a wholesale success or failure of the revolution, it seems clear initially that it is correlated 
to some degree with the outcome of the revolution. 
2.2 Geostrategic Considerations 
The cases chosen for this project are tied together by at least as much as that which 
separates  them.  In  designing this  study,  it  was essential  to  hold as  many things  constant  as 
possible, so that variation on some other factor would not distort our conception of the cases, and 
we would not attribute correlation where this attribution was not due. For this reason, each of the 
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cases were hemmed in regionally, so as to limit variation in the geostrategic context of the cases. 
The Middle East region was chosen because US Department of State policy can be assumed to 
be relatively uniform across this region, in comparison to inter-regional policy. Secondly, this 
selection provided a region wherein the tenets of Islam were used as both guiding lights for 
national policy, and provide for a similar individual civilian mentality towards the West. In this 
way,  apart  from being a fascinating area,  rich in opportunity for  discovery,  the Middle East 
stricture provides at least a baseline degree of geostrategic stability. 
As importantly, this study controlled for temporal variation by limiting its scope to cases 
of revolution since 1979. While there are certainly important cases of Middle East revolution that 
fall outside this temporal boundary, this timeframe provides a relative consistency in regards to 
the major events which transpired in the Middle East. By the end of the 1979 Iranian revolution, 
Israel  had  been  established  and  defended  successfully  as  a  legitimate  Middle  East  state. 
Furthermore, the Arab states of the MENA region had by 1979 began to align around the ideals 
of Pan-Arabism and “anti-Israelism”. Furthermore, the geopolitical regional superpowers of the 
Midde East which would shortly dominate the political landscape were already emerging. With 
the influence of OPEC, founded nearly 20 years prior solidifying Saudi Arabia as a significant 
player  in  Gulf  and  Levantine  wealth  and  control,  Israel’s  clear  US-backed  mandate  as  an 
independent power, Egypt’s Sadat beginning the process of coming to terms with US superiority 
and  being  bought  off,  and  finally  the  wave  of  ultra-Islamism sweeping  into  Iran  and  other 
nations, the stage was set for a time of relative geostrategic stability in the Middle East. To a 
large extent, these factors did indeed give rise to an era between 1979-2011 that saw significant 
regional stability in the relative distribution of power between the states of the Middle East. 
Furthermore, the relative contemporary nature of the chosen timeframe provided a context which 
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would allow for deep analysis within the case studies, where any earlier case studies would have 
supplied significant  restrictions  regarding the  availability  of  necessary economic,  social,  and 
judicial data.
While the above mentioned stricture do allow for a number of essential values to be held 
constant, no set of case studies can be entirely pure, particularly when dealing with a 30 year 
timeframe. In this way, the selection of any region around the world in recent history which 
would promise a reasonably high level of cases to study would likely also sacrifice the stability 
of the context due to long time horizons, or other important regional issues. In the case of the 
case studies chosen for this project, the greatest limiting factor from a geostrategic perspective is 
the wider world context. Regarding the Syria and Iran cases, US leaders were locked into a series 
of Cold War proxy engagements that significantly limited the capacity of American leaders to 
intervene in certain states of the Middle East. During their revolution, Iran was a close US ally, 
which put them firmly outside the influence of Soviet leaders. For this reason, American leaders 
were able to intervene significantly in 1979 without much fear of Soviet reaction. The case of 
Syria is entirely different than this, however. In 1982, Assad had firmly placed himself within the 
zone of Soviet protection. For this reason, an auspicious US intervention into a sovereign Syrian 
conflict would mean almost sure war between the US and USSR, thus shattering a tenuous, hard-
built East-West peace. By the same token, Libya, another Cold War Soviet ally was unallied with 
a major global power which could stand as an effective deterrent to US intervention in 2011. For 
this reason, and because it suited the interests of American leaders, US leaders stopped at nothing 
to join with their European and other allies in obliterating Libyan air defenses and bombing the 
convoy that was to carry Gaddafi to safety outside of Sirte. This contrast between cases makes 
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clear the case that geostrategic constraints were highly important in determining whether US 
forces intervened and to what degree they intervened in the cases of revolution. 
While these cases hold many factors constant, the geostrategic differences between the 
cases are pertinent and certainly gave rise to limitations which governed US response to some 
degree. To some degree, the selection of these cases represent a choice of necessity. Recognizing 
that there will be variation in any selection of cases requires any project to select cases which 
minimize  this  noise,  while  also  providing  an  interesting  context  for  research.  In  this  way, 
necessity is a limiting factor, but it seems that this would be a factor in any set of cases selected. 
For  this  project,  necessity  is  a  virtue  to  the  selection  of  cases,  because  it  demonstrates  the 
inevitability of variation in case DVs, and shows the limitation of case studies as a form of 
analysis. This should not be regarded as a fatal limitation to retrospective case studies, but rather 
a strategic limitation that requires thoughtful consideration, as any other does. 
2.3 Geostrategic Constraint - What US Wanted vs. What US Could Get
Auspiciously missing from the body of this work is a conversation which incorporates a 
calculation  of  relative  power  and  constraint.  If  misunderstood,  this  absence  could  give  the 
impression that this work treats relative power and geostrategic constraint as immaterial. This is, 
however, not the case. This project recognizes the importance of power and constraint in full. It’s 
error, if any, may be that it under-represents its centrality in American decisions to intervene. 
This is done in part because in many cases since the end of the Cold War, the US had to consider 
very little in terms of a state’s ability to withstand against its decision to intervene, and because 
after the fall of the Soviet Union, there were no significant rivals that could and would be likely 
to challenge a US decision to intervene in cases of regional instability. It is for this reason that 
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the US interventions in Libya, Iraq, Afghanistan, and other states around the world were done 
with  such  blatant  disregard  to  states  in  the  periphery  which  might  object  to  American 
intervention. 
In two of the selected cases for this  project,  these assumptions must  be relaxed,  and 
constraint  must  be  considered.  Furthermore,  this  analysis  would  be  remiss  if  it  entirely 18
disqualified a discussion of relative power relating to any of the chosen cases. The Syria 1982 
case gives the greatest example of US constraint, as Syrian leader, Assad, enjoyed a longstanding 
relationship with Soviet leaders,  and stood firmly under the Soviet umbrella of protection in 
1982. This limitation severely hampered US capacity to respond to the actions of the Assad 
regime in 1982, and may well have led to the Assad government’s opportunity to crush the Hama 
Revolution. Furthermore, Syrian stability to US leaders was of little concern to American leaders 
during this time. While Assad was a strong regional leader and was projecting his strength into 
other  regional  states,  he was not  of  sufficient  strength or  importance at  the time to  warrant 
serious efforts to overthrow by US leaders. These factors in combination with American strategic 
interests  were  likely  to  blame for  the  lack  of  American  response  to  the  violence  in  Hama. 
Therefore, despite the fact that American leaders may have felt general positive feelings about 
the  notion  of  seeing  Assad ripped from power,  the  constraining  factor  of  large-scale  Soviet 
backlash was sufficient to constrain US interest. 
 These constraints were not seen in the cases of Iran 1979, Libya 2011, or Egypt 2011. 
For Iran, while the US was engaged in the Cold War during this time, US leaders were free to 
 I argue that the strategic limitations put on US leaders during the Cold War era are much like the limitations of the modern era. 18
tWith the reemergence of regional centers of power which have the capacity to challenge US power, US geostrategic calculation 
must now be adjusted to accommodate both for the relative power of regional actors, and for the likelihood of intervention by these 
powers. 
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respond how they chose because Pahlavi had resisted Soviet overtures in favor of US alliance. 
Furthermore, the importance of Iranian stability was very high, due to both strategic calculations 
and longterm US-Persian relations. In the cases from 2011, as mentioned before, the Cold War 
constraints didn’t exist, and thus US leaders were more free to intervene, or not intervene, how 
they chose. Moreover, during this time, both of these states were of relatively high importance to 
US leaders: Egypt due to the longterm relationship enjoyed between leaders, and Libya, because 
of  the  destabilizing  effect  that  Gaddafi  had  had  on  the  region  and  his  involvement  with 
transnational terrorism. 19
2.4 Syria 1982
The failed revolution which came into full swing in February of 1982 was preceded in 
Syria by the decades-long rule of strongman, Hafiz-al Asad.  Taking power through a military 20
coup  in  1970,  Asad  began  a  30  year  rule  which  was  punctuated  by  religious  tension, 
 See Visualization 219
 In this work, I refer to the events in Syria in 1982 as the Hama Revolution. While the events in Hama and elsewhere in Syria did 20
not turn into a large scale national revolution, its components fit into the category of an attempted revolution. This term is not used to 
characterize these events as a full-scale revolution, but to properly classify them as pre-revolutionary events, despite their ultimate 
failure. 
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centralization of national control, and political repression of dissenters. (Perthes, 1995) (Seale & 
McConville, 1989) As president, Hafiz-al Asad’s rule emphasized his Alawi roots, (Al-Hawadith, 
1980) and caused many Syrian Muslims to criticize the government for rampant corruption and 
sectarian inequality produced by his Alawi and political ally-preferring policies. (Ma’oz, 1993) 
In addition to domestic corruption, Asad’s regime through the 1970s and early 1980s engaged in 
regional interventions which aimed to preserve or create a Middle Eastern environment which 
suited Asad and his allies. By fumbling their intervention in Israel during the October War of 
1973  (O’Ballance,  1978),  auspiciously supporting Iran during the Iran-Iraq War (Goodarzi, 21
2010), and intervening in Lebanon’s various national upheavals (Ma’oz, 1993) (Petran, 1987), 
Asad caused tensions to rise among low-income Syrians; a trend that Islamist radicals in Syria 
were able to capitalize on in order to stage a massive national uprising against the government of 
Asad. (Lawson, 1982)
As  Asad  continued  to  centralize  power  and  political  influence  among  his  allies,  the 
policies of his government became more repressive, and less representative of large portions of 
the Syrian population. (Perthes, 1995) The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, a transnational Islamist 
group who’s ideology was set against nationalism and secularism set itself against the secular 
Arab-nationalist agendas of the Assad regime. Capitalizing on popular feelings of discontentment 
due to economic disadvantage, widespread nepotism, and corruption, the Muslim Brotherhood 
began staging large protests in urban centers around Syria. Frustrated by a perceived waste of 
state funds in a revisionist agenda aimed at supporting Lebanon’s campaign against Palestinians, 
Syrian tradesmen and workers united in opposition to the government of Asad. (Lefèvre, 2013) 
 At the conclusion of Syria’s engagement in the October War, the Syrian army was decimated, and the Syrian government lost 21
control of the strategically important Golan Heights in Southwestern Syria. This loss is most often blamed on internal divisions 
between political and military faction most loyal to Asad and those who were loyal to Syrian military leaders who were more informed 
about the strategic calculations regarding the war. (See Perthes 1995, pg.3)
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After two years of protest and increased tension between revolters and the national government, 
including assassination attempts, the Syrian army withdrew temporarily from Lebanon and sent 
12,000  troops  to  the  city  of  Hama,  the  center  of  revolt  activity  to  engage  in  a  three  week 
offensive which crushed the uprising, and resulted in the death of an estimated 10,000 people. 
(Fisk, 1991) (Conduit, 2016)
At its conclusion, the uprising which started at the beginning of February of 1982 was 
completely desolated by Hafiz-al Asad and his troops. The Muslim Brotherhood and its most 
known  remaining  members  were  exiled,  killed,  or  fled  Syria  in  the  days  after  the  Hama 
Revolution ended. Having destroyed the most potent challenge to his rule, Asad would now be 
able to continue to consolidate power into his own hands with a high level of surety that his 
opponents  were  either  too disorganized,  or  too fearful  to  seriously  challenge his  rule  again. 
Retrospectively, the revolution that never was failed first, because the Asad regime had done 
enough to buy off and accommodate nearly 77% of Syrian workers, so the frustrations of rural 
farmers and shop keepers were not relatable to them, and they were unwilling to sacrifice their 
newfound security for the concerns of farmers. For this reason, only small marches and protests 
were seen in centers like Aleppo and Damascus. (Lawson, 1996) Furthermore, the willingness of 
the  Asad administration  to  relentlessly  crush  the  rebellion  in  Hama showed their  resolve  to 
maintain power and further showed the futility of any group’s endeavor to pry power from Asad. 
The instillation of fear into Syrian opposition silenced other disadvantaged groups around Syria 
in fear of being dealt with in a similar fashion. (Perthes, 1995)
Syria Case - Economic Factors 
The economy of Syria in 1979 and 1980 can be characterized as one of development and 
opportunity, but great inequality. When Hafiz-al Asad came to power in 1970, he began on a 
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strategy of nationalizing large parts of the national economy in an endeavor to dry up the wealth 
and economic power of the political  elites who were deposed after the 1970 coup. (Perthes, 
1995) As Asad continued to redevelop the Syrian economy, he endeavored to emphasize Socialist 
principles, and hoped to pull resources away from the strong agricultural sector, and provide 
them towards the development of a new business class. (Newnations, 2000) At the same time, 
due to new policies which resulted from the nationalization of Syrian industry, the salaries of 
industrial workers in nationalized industry, a group representing 56% of Syrian workers, became 
guaranteed. (Perthes, 1995) This new emphasis disadvantaged up to 25% of Syrian workers who 
felt as though they were to be thanked for the strength of the Syrian economy of the 1960s. As 
Syrian factory workers, oil workers, and businessmen enjoyed newfound wealth in metropolitan 
centers  around  Syria,  agricultural  workers  and  tradesmen  in  rural  portions  of  Syria,  which 
represented nearly a third of Syrian workers at the time, began feeling left behind and became 
angry as their personal wealth decreased relative to that of those living in cities. (Drysdale, 1982) 
As nationalization continued and the disparity between wealthy urbanites and increasingly poor 
agricultural  workers  increased,  opportunistic  social  and political  groups  such as  the  Muslim 
Brotherhood needed nothing more than to kindle the embers of anger and frustration in order to 
begin an uprising against the State.
In 1978, the Syrian economy had been growing consistently by various metrics. Rising 
from 2.2 billion when Asad gained control in 1970 to 13 billion in 1980, two years before the 
Hama Revolution, Syrian GDP was stronger than any time preceding.  By 1982, Syrian GDP 22
had continued to rise to just under 16 billion in a meteoric rise which placed the Syrian economy 
on a trajectory to shortly eclipse most others in the MENA region. The great expansion of Syrian 
 See Visualization 2A22
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GDP during  this  time  was  largely  due  to  the  increase  in  global  oil  prices,  which  brought 
increased revenue to the national economy. Furthermore, as the forces of globalization expanded 
their influence, Syrians increasingly moved to other more oil-rich states of the Middle East for 
economic opportunities and sent remittances back to Syria. (Collelo, 1987) 
Unemployment in Syria was not officially reported until 1991 by the World Bank. Thus, 
little is known regarding this metric from the time prior to the Hama Revolution. This is likely a 
product of two factors. First, the national government likely suppressed the publication of poor 
looking unemployment numbers in order to maintain a facade of economic development in the 
face of foreign investment and national appeal. Second, in the 1970s and 1980s, large portions of 
the Syrian economy did not officially exist. Due in part to the agrarian nature out of which the 
Syrian economy was still emerging by 1982, a large portion of the Syrian economy could not be 
reported on. (Lawson, 1996) In the 1970s and early 1980s, a large proportion of the national 
population  was  working  in  nationalized  industry.  During  this  time,  the  Syrian  government 
Source: The World Bank
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regulated  that  companies  were  required  to  employ  much more  people  than  their  companies 
actually required, in order to suppress the high unemployment which resulted from the poor 
business environment that was produced by Asad’s Socialist economy. (Perthes, 1995) Because 
of this, companies which operated in Syria were required to employ, in some cases, thousands 
more workers than were necessary. In an economy like Syria’s, what is likely more accurate to 
say is that a high proportion of workers in the country were heavily underemployed. Because of 
the  influence  of  the  aforementioned  nationalization,  agriculturalists  and  shopkeepers  around 
Syria saw family incomes decrease sharply in the mid-1970s. (Lawson, 1982) Because of this, 
many Syrian families were forced to subsist on significantly less income than prior. This resulted 
in a large proportion of the country being far underemployed.
Other economic indicators in Syria were not as strong prior to the Hama Revolution. Just 
prior to Hafiz-al Asad’s overthrow of the preceding al-Atassi government, the Syrian economy 
was booming due largely to the success of the agricultural industry and saw a negative inflation 
rate  of  -1.98%.  (World  Bank,  2001)  After  more  than  a  decade  of  Asad’s  socialist-leaning, 
regionally revisionist policies, Syrian inflation soared to 18.39%, a rate which was higher than all 
other MENA nation at the time, with the exception of Iran and Israel.  Furthermore, while Syria 23
did not default on its international debts, the Syrian government refused to pay any more towards 
their international debtors than the minimum which was required in order to keep from becoming 
insolvent. (Perthes, 1995) Furthermore, during Asad’s reforms from 1970 - 1981, Syrian external 
debt  increased  from  $278  million  (Current  USD)  to  nearly  4.9  billion  in  little  more  than 
decade.  These  increases  in  both  inflation  and  external  borrowing  resulted  in  an  excessive 24
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increase in the cost of living, particularly in metropolitan centers. By 1972, Asad had raised the 
consumer tax rate to 36% from its rate of 25% prior to the coup of 1970, in order to pay for his 
nationalization ventures. (Cummings et. al., 1982) By 1977, consumer tax rates decreased back 
to 15%, but seemed to be on a path toward unabashed increase when the government increased 
taxes by 5% in 1980. (Lawson, 1982)
VIS. 2C
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Syria Case - Social & Judicial Factors
From the outset of the Asad government in Syria, there was widespread frustration over 
the centralization of power that happened after the 1970 coup. Since Asad came from the ranks 
of the military, he had a strong handle on their leadership, and often jailed or otherwise purged 
leaders from the military who were suspected of being unfaithful to his directives. (Macintyre, 
2011) In this way, Asad ensured that the military did not gain significant political power, and no 
military leader got too powerful independent of his control. By this means, Asad’s government 
attempted to rule the military and civilians with absolute control and through political repression. 
(Pertes, 1995) (Lefèvre, 2013)
After his takeover and the deposing of the old ruling elite from before 1970, Asad filled 
government offices and high posts with other Baathist leaders with nationalistic and socialistic 
leanings, and sought to give new power to merchants and the landlord class, in order to purchase 
their allegiance. (Perthes, 1995) This fueled popular frustration at the sense of nepotism and 
internal corruption that citizens had regarding Asad’s leadership. When Asad took power,  he 
reestablished the national parliament and allowed for the creation of new parties. The influence 
of these parties would largely be eclipsed by that of the ruling secularist Ba'ath Party, which was 
named  “the  leader  party  in  the  state  and  society”  in  Syria,  rendering  the  Baath  Party 
indistinguishable from the State. (Ziadeh, 2011) In addition to these reforms, Asad demanded the 
drafting of a new state constitution in 1974 which allowed the executive unabridged authority 
over the legislative and judicial branches of government. (Baladi, 2016) (Carlisle, 2005) The new 
constitution provided Asad with complete authority over Syria’s national intelligence bureaus 
and the military. By the times the Hama Revolution took place, it was clear that Asad wanted to 
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ensure that all government offices and positions were held by those he trusted, and that he was 
not afraid to subvert national law in order to stay in power. Furthermore, while his corruption and 
abuses were evident to many in Syria, he was strategically immune politically, as he had the 
capacity to buy off those who might influence his authority and institutional power over Syria. 
Syria Case - American Interventional Response
Asad’s economic and political decisions cost him influence and respect internationally. As 
Asad socialized the Syrian economy and centralized state power around himself, this put Syria 
into the orbit of the Soviet Union. Because of this and Asad’s totalitarian tact, this put him at 
odds with his American-sided neighbors. When Asad made the decision to join in on the October 
War aggression against the newly founded State of Israel and their support of Iran in the Iran-
Iraq War, this further entrenched Syria as a pariah state and left Syria with few friends. The strain 
of relationships with other nations in 1981 led to an inhospitable international environment for 
the 1982 Hama Revolution to take place in. 
The confluence of economic, political, judicial, and social difficulties that Syria faced in 
the  lead up to  the  1982 Hama Revolution were  significant  to  say the  least.  Syria  had been 
violently taken over by a brutal military leader who forced the collapsed of the agricultural sector 
of  the  Syrian  economy,  and  victimized  many  politically  and  economically.  Furthermore,  he 
wrenched  political  control  from  those  who  opposed  him  in  every  political  and  military 
directorate, and ensured that he had full control of the State apparatus so that he could wield its 
power against his state and domestic enemies. It is for these reasons that it is surprising that the 
revolution which started and ended in Hama in February of 1982 was entirely unsuccessful in its 
aims of forcing governmental change. It is clear that the variables that were influential in the 
onset of revolution were insufficient to produce large-scale national change in Syria. 
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American foreign aid to Syria has been of marginal impact since it was first provided in 
1960. From 1970, when Hafiz-al Asad took control of Syria, until the 1982 Hama Revolution, the 
United States only provided foreign aid to Syria intermittently for 5 years. Almost all of the aid 
provided to Syria during this time was provided as development assistance or emergency relief 
for areas of Syria which were struck by famine. In 1975, the US government approved foreign 
aid in the amount of $669 million to Syria and continued to provide foreign aid until 1979 in 
roughly the same amount. In 1980, the US ceased foreign aid provision to Syria until 2008, when 
the US began providing humanitarian relief again to refugees.  25 26
The  Asad  government’s  response  to  the  Hama  Revolution  lasted  three  weeks,  as 
government troops surrounded and besieged the city and its inhabitants. During this time, little 
was  done  by  the  United  States  to  infringe  on  the  Asad administration’s  desire  to  crush  the 
rebellion by force. Because the United States was already not giving any foreign aid, there was 
 See Visualization 2D25
 It has been suggested that during the 1982 failed revolution, the American Central Intelligence Agency endeavored to supply arms 26
and munitions to Syrian rebels through Jordan. While this may be the case, after an exhaustive search of both historical records and 
contemporary periodical review, there are no reliable citable sources that provide a confirmation of this suggestion. While it is 
imaginable that US covert operations did endeavor to influence the stability of the Assad regime in 1982, the pertinent details of this 
intervention are still not available to be analyzed. For this reason, this project only analyzes intervention narratives for which there is 
a clear, reliable, and citable source. 
   of  56 136
none to remove, and by the same token, because there were no joint military agreements, there 
were none removed either. Using its sway in the UN, the US did not suggest any retaliatory 
action  against  Asad,  nor  were  there  any  suggestions  of  sanction,  based  on  the  conducted 
research. (DOT, 2013) The US government did not maneuver to pressure or to force Asad to 
back down, nor was there any military strike to force a different conclusion to the uprising. 
Finally, despite the fact that the Hama Revolution was covered by the media, there is no official 
record  of  statements  from US leaders  condemning,  promoting,  or  otherwise  referencing  the 
events. In these ways, it seems as though there was no notable American response to the Asad 
administration’s activities against Syrian revolters during the Hama Revolution. While the Assad 
government clearly stood as a Middle East power which was both ideologically and militarily set 
at  odds  with  American  political  and  military  priorities,  the  Cold  War  constraints  which  US 
leaders found themselves under were certainly impactful to the decision of US leaders not to 
intervene, if not entirely motivational unto themselves. There is no doubt that given to their own 
strategic calculations, US leaders would prefer to see the Assad government in Syria replaced, 
but given the likelihood of massive Soviet reprisal during the Cold War, American power was not 
able to be made evident, and Assad was left to crush the rebellion. 
2.5 Egypt 2011
The failed 2011 popular revolution in Egypt is certainly one of the most salient examples 
of Middle Eastern uprisings during the events of the Arab Spring between 2008 and 2012. While 
the  revolution  was  initially  successful,  causing  the  deposition  of  longtime  dictator  Hosni 
Mubarak and prompting the first free and open elections in Egyptian history, the successes of the 
revolution were shortly overturned as the military took over the political system and installed a 
military leader as political premier. Prior to the events which resulted in the revolution, Egypt 
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had been ruled since 1981 by Hosni Mubarak, Egypt’s Vice President until the assassination of 
President Anwar Sadat, whom he replaced. (Lesch, 1989) Since the time of Nasser, Egyptian 
citizens had been living under unaccountable dictatorship with little  opportunity for political 
involvement. (Azzam, 2010) Mubarak was a military leader who had risen through the ranks of 
the Egyptian Air Force and been appointed Vice President of Egypt by Anwar Sadat in 1975. 
(Deborchgrave,  2011)  Upon Sadat’s  assassination  in  October  of  1981,  Mubarak  was  named 
President. (Amin, 2012)
Motivated  by  the  successful  ouster  of  longtime  dictator  Ben  Ali  in  Tunisia  in  early 
January 2011 and the mass protests beginning in Algeria, Egyptians took to the streets across 
Egypt to protest the nearly 30 year oppressive rule of Hosni Mubarak. As protesters filled the 
streets of Cairo, Alexandria, and Giza, Mubarak hoped to instill fear in protestors and ordered the 
military to engage in a massive crackdown which led to over 6,000 Egyptians being injured and 
over  840  deaths.  (Amnesty  International,  2011)  These  events  catalyzed  the  frustrations  of 
Egyptians however and caused revolutionary support around the country to swell. Using social 
media  platforms  as  a  mechanism  to  unite  them  in  their  frustrations,  Egyptian  revolters 
successfully forced the ouster of Hosni Mubarak on February 11, 2011 and demanded free and 
open democratic elections for the first time in Egypt’s history.  At the conclusion of the 2011 27
Egyptian revolution, Mubarak was tried for crimes against the people of Egypt, and Egyptians 
elected a far-right representative of the Muslim Brotherhood Islamist group, Mohammed Morsi. 
The effects of the 2011 election would be short lived as the Egyptian military would force the 
deposition of the democratically elected Morsi and install Army General and director of State 
intelligence, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi.
 While Mubarak allowed for elections to occur in 2005, both Egyptian and international observers determined that this was not 27
likely a free election due to election rigging and voter suppression. See (Wittes, 2016)
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By most metrics, the national economy of Egypt prior to the revolution of 2011 was quite 
strong  despite  rampant  corruption.  As  one  of  the  largest  and  most  consistent  recipients  of 
American foreign aid, and the home to the largest tourist economy in North Africa. In 2010, just 
prior to the revolution, tourism brought 14.7 million visitors to Egypt and generated $12.5 billion 
in  national  revenues,  a  figure  representing  more  than  11% of  Egyptian  GDP (Smith,  2014) 
(Ragab, 2014) As a result of the violence of the resolution, revenues from tourism dipped by 
30.5% in the following year to $8.7 billion. The strength of the tourism industry is representative 
of the general strength of the economy in Egypt prior to the revolution and shows that while 
concerns over the economy certainly played a part in the onset of the revolution, the economy 
was not the most significant driver. 
Egyptian GDP prior to the revolution was generally strong and on an upward trend. Apart 
from the 2002-2006 slump which resulted from the September 11 attacks in the United States 
and the decrease in oil prices, Egyptian GDP had been on an upward trend since 1991. By 2010, 
Egyptian GDP stood at $218 billion, an astonishing $56 billion increase from two years prior.  28
Between the years of 2000 and 2011, Egyptian GDP grew at an average rate of $12.45 billion per 
year. By comparison, the average GDP growth rate from 1970-1981, under Sadat, was $1.42 
billion per year. This means that GDP growth under Mubarak from 2000-2011 was 876% better 
than that of the Sadat years. Furthermore, this growth rate was better than that of any MENA 
nation during that time, with the exception of Qatar. (Worldbank, 2015) Because of the relative 
strength, and the overall strength of the economy during this time, consumer confidence in Egypt 
stayed quite high in the decade prior to the revolution. (Nielson, 2015)
 See Visualization 2E28
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Between the years of 1991-2010, Egyptian unemployment stayed stable and generally 
between 8-12% of  total  Egyptian population.  In  2010,  just  one year  prior  to  the outset  of 29
revolution, the Egyptian official unemployment rate, stood at 9%. This figure was roughly at 
average with other nations in the MENA region at the time. (World Bank, 2015) Furthermore, 
during this time, Egypt’s youth unemployment level dropped from its 2005 high of 22.7% to 
14.8% in 2010, following a regional trend and maintaining its status as a rough regional median 
rate. Information regarding Egypt’s unemployment rate is only selectively available, as Egypt’s 
Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS) did not consistently publish 
unemployment statistics prior to the year 1991. This is a hinderance as it makes a comparative 
analysis of unemployment under Sadat vs. unemployment under Mubarak impossible. 
 See Visualization 2F29
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Egyptian inflation in the years prior to the 2011 revolution was highly variable, as it has 
been since the early 1980s, and was the highest inflation rate in the Middle East, at 10.36%.  30
(Worldbank, 2015) Egyptian inflation since 1970 has been generally high since 1970, and only 
occasionally has dropped from being among the highest inflation rates in the Middle East. In 
1970, when Anwar Sadat became President of Egypt, inflation been steadily held at 3% for two 
years, and was in a general downward trend. By 1980, only a year prior to Sadat’s assassination, 
Egyptian inflation grew to 20.81%. Upon Mubarak’s  taking over,  Egyptian inflation initially 
dove to a low of 10.31% in 1981, but soon soared to a record setting 23.86% by 1986, due in part 
to  an  explosion  of  population  growth,  excessive  quantitative  easing,  and  a  steep  decline  in 
national  productivity.  (Oweiss,  1989)  From  1986  to  2001,  Egyptian  inflation  consistently 
decreased to its lowest point since 1972 to 2.26% in 2001. From its low point in 2001 until 2010, 
inflation rose  consistently  again and finished at  11.26%. While  this  rate  is  relatively  low in 
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comparison to historic inflation rates in Egypt, the inflation rate in Egypt was a full 6 points 
higher  than  the  average  of  other  MENA states,  and  higher  than  all  but  3  MENA states. 
(Worldbank, 2015) (Carvalho, 2010)
Egyptian  external  debt  levels  between  1989  and  2010  remained  relatively  stable  at 
roughly $30 - $40 billion, after a meteoric rise from less than $10 billion to over $45 billion in 
1989.  Egyptian debt since the mid-70s has consistently been among the highest in the Middle 31
East.  (Randa, 2003) Through the late 1970s and into the 1980s, creditors including the IMF 
became frustrated  with  the  continually  rising  proportion  of  debt  that  Egyptian  leaders  were 
incurring. In 1987 under Mubarak, Egyptian public debt rose to near parity with national GDP, 
after which Mubarak instituted new drastic reform measures called IMF Conditionality in order 
to provide a longterm solution to the growing economic issues. (Chapin-Metz, 1990) As a result 
of  the  restructuring implemented in  the  1990s,  Egypt  enjoyed more than 20 years  of  stable 
external debt levels after the 1990s reforms which leaders implemented. As a result, Egyptian 
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external debt was stable leading into the 2011 revolution, but still higher than any other nation in 
the region. 
Prior to the 2011 revolution, the Egyptian system of taxation was well-developed, but not 
well-managed. Due to a high level of tax evasion by both citizens and businesses, Egyptian tax 
law was broadly seen as ineffectual and selectively applied. (Fawzy & Galalm, 1999) Egypt’s 
personal income, and corporate tax laws were well-defined as of 2010, and were considered to be 
roughly average for developing countries of the Middle East during that time. (Ernst & Young, 
2010) (Deloitte, 2015) Because of the uneven nature of income tax collection, data relating to the 
level  of  taxation  and  the  degree  of  revenue  produced  by  private  tax  collection  is  generally 
unavailable. In 2010, just a year prior to the outset of revolution, tax revenues represented only 
14% of Egyptian GDP, down from its early 1980s high of 24.82%. (IMF, 2013) (World Bank, 
2015) While this level rose roughly 2% from 2002, it was near an all time low, and was in a 
general downward trend. Furthermore, corporate taxes, who’s rates are much more available than 
Source: The World Bank
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private tax rates, were one of the highest of the MENA states, but were in a generally downward 
trend from their business-stifling 2005 high of 54.4%. 
Egypt Case - Social & Judicial Factors
From the time that Mohamed Naguib wrestled power from Egypt’s final monarchs in 
1952, Egypt progressively slid into a more authoritarian political environment, punctuated by the 
extreme centralization of authority by the President. (Mansfield, 1973) After the October 1981 
assassination of President Anwar Sadat by an ultra-nationalist faction of the Egyptian military, 
President Mubarak declared the enactment of Emergency Law 162. (Reza, 2007) This law was 
intended to suspend most constitutional rights, increased the authority of the military, and give 
virtually  unlimited  power  to  the  President  over  State,  military,  judicial,  and  societal  affairs. 
(Dunne, 2006) In order to maintain ultimate control over institutional power, Mubarak renewed 
the emergency law’s provisions every 3 years until  2012.  (Stacher,  2012) This lead to State 
autonomy  from democratic  constraint,  and  made  Mubarak  the  Commander  in  Chief  of  the 
Egyptian military,  the Chief of the Cabinet,  and Executive of all  political  happenings in the 
country. (Fahemy, 2002) This authority, and the President’s role in appointing judges to all of 
Egypt’s national courts led to a perception that the presidency was above prosecution and would 
only be toppled by popular unrest or external forces. (Fahemy, 2002)
Starting  with  the  presidency  of  military  leader  Naguib,  his  succession  by  Nasser, 
Mubarak, and finally Sisi, all high-ranking military officers, the relationship between the State 
and the military was very close. Under Mubarak, the role of the military in the daily life of 
Egyptians increased with the imposition of emergency law. Mubarak was careful to limit the 
ability of the military to independently exert itself in the political arena, and would often sack 
military leaders that became too politically vocal, or threatened to change the State narrative 
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apart from Mubarak’s control. (Kurtzer & Svenstrup, 2012) (Fahemy, 2002) While this was the 
case, because all of Egypt’s presidents had become president through military succession, the 
role of the Egyptian military was central to Egypt’s economy and political structure. (Kurtzer & 
Svenstrup, 2012) The strength and political separation of the military from the State ended up 
being a benefit to revolutionaries in Tahrir Square in 2011, as the president depended on their 
willingness to reign in political upheaval, and military leaders were ready to see an increase in 
their relative power in the Egyptian state system. (Martini & Taylor, 2011) (Bentlage, 2010)
Egypt’s judiciary prior to the 2011 was one characterized by ineffectuality and corruption 
during the Mubarak era. (Reza, 2007) In 1969, Nasser’s Massacre of the Judiciary eliminated 
much of the independence that judges enjoyed by installing new institutions through which the 
president could govern the judiciary, and instituting a Supreme Court with little authority over 
the  presidency.  (Bernard-Maugiron,  2008)  This  resulted  in  a  deeper  sense  of  autonomy for 
Mubarak, and an inability to ouster him or any subsequent executive by legal means. By 2010, 
the  Egyptian  State  had  one  court  which  was  considered  to  be  nominally  independent,  the 
Supreme Constitutional Court (ايلع%%%%%%%%لا ة%%%%%%%%يروت%%%%%%%%سد%%%%%%%%لا ةمكح%%%%%%%%لما). (Fahemy, 2002) Even in cases however 
wherein the court ruled against the interests of the Mubarak presidency, Mubarak was able to 
disregard the court’s rulings with little in the way of repercussions. (Moustafa, 2003) (Fahemy, 
2002) 
The  unicameral  Egyptian  Parliament  (ىر%%ص%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%لما  باو%%ن%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%لا  س%%ل%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%ج%%م)  prior  to  2011  was 
overwhelmingly dominated by the National Party (ي%%%%%%%%%%%%طارقم%%%%%%%%%%%%يد%%%%%%%%%%%%لا ين%%%%%%%%%%%%طو%%%%%%%%%%%%لا بز%%%%%%%%%%%%حلا), which was led 
directly by Mubarak, and Sadat before him. Because of this, the parliament was widely seen as 
feckless and ceremonial, as their decisions almost always sided with Mubarak’s. (Fahemy, 2002) 
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Prior to the 2011 revolution, 10 major political parties sprung up and were established in Egypt’s 
parliament, representing a shift in Mubarak-centric legislation. (USDOJ, 2008) Mubarak would 
later outlaw many of these new parties, and still others would later be outlawed by Mohamed 
Morsi, Mubarak’s democratically elected successor.
Egypt Case - American Interventional Response
American foreign aid to Egypt has since 1975 been among the highest  in the world, 
receiving an average of $4.504 billion per year since 1975, and encompassing 32% of all foreign 
aid given to the Middle East region year-to-year.  American foreign aid began flowing to Egypt 32
consistently in 1974, resulting in a Cold War alliance that allowed US leaders to project their 
own power  into  the  Middle  East  and  Africa  in  order  to  counter  Soviet  expansion  from the 
Caucuses  and  Eastern  Europe.  With  the  collapse  of  the  US relationship  with  Iran  after  the 
1978-1979 Islamic Revolution, American foreign aid to Egypt increased to an all time maximum
of $9 billion. This influx of US funds followed a regional trend, as US foreign aid into the 
MENA region generally increased to its highest level of all time - a level that wouldn’t be met 
again until 2004. In 2004, US foreign aid to Egypt rose to $5.75 billion, after which it began to 
slowly recede. In 2010, American foreign aid provision to Egypt totaled $3.3 billion, down from 
its  2009  high  of  $4.15  billion.  In  the  years  following  the  revolution,  American  foreign  aid 
continued to  decrease  to  Egypt,  but  did  not  accelerate  from its  pre-revolution rate  until  the 
subsequent 2013 military coup.33
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The  American  response  to  the  January  25  revolution  was  nuanced,  and  generally 
supported the rights of the Egyptian people to democratically choose their leaders, despite the 
close relationship that Mubarak had long-enjoyed with US presidents. On the evening of January 
28th,  American President Obama released a televised statement calling for a continuation of 
Source: USAID, 2014
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democratic protests in a peaceful way, and calling for the Egyptian government to allow the 
future  of  Egypt’s  government  to  be  decided  by  the  people,  eluding  to  their  interest  in  free 
democratic elections. (The White House, 2011) 
In the early days of the Tahrir Square protests, Mubarak’s government seemed sure that 
protest activity would die out, and Mubarak’s long rule would continue as normal. However, as 
protests spread around the country, amid American calls for quiescence, Mubarak orchestrated a 
massive repression which resulted in the killing of over 800 civilians. (Heikh & Fahim, 2013) It 
is clear that Mubarak’s government underestimated the resolve and capacity of revolters, as these 
violent responses only increased the determination of revolters. Fearing that the revolution would 
end  up  successfully  ousting  Mubarak,  in  the  first  days  of  February  2011,  American  leaders 
became entirely unambiguous in their calls for Mubarak to resign. In addition to imposing travel 
restrictions to Egypt for American nationals,  on February 1, 2011, the US embassy in Cairo 
evacuated all non-essential diplomatic and security personnel and threatened to reduce American 
aid to Egypt if Mubarak continues to refuse to step down in the face of months-long protests 
across Egypt.  (Thomson Reuters,  2011) Finally,  on the night  of  February 1,  2011,  President 
Obama addressed  Mubarak  and  said  an  “orderly  transition  must  be  meaningful,  it  must  be 
peaceful, and it must begin now. (The White House, 2011)” After losing any hope of US support 
for his continued rule over Egypt, President Hosni Mubarak stepped down on February 11, 2011, 
and allowed free and open elections to commence for the first time in Egypt’s history. Despite 
the initial great successes of the 2011 Egyptian revolution, its success was short—lived. After 
spurring the development of new democratic institutions, electing its first national leader, and 
causing great national change, the Egyptian military swept into control and unseated the newly 
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elected leader in 2013, effectively returning Egypt to its pre-revolutionary status with a new 
military head in power, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi.
2.6 Iran 1979
Prior to the successful 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, Iranian State politics had been 
governed by the Western-backed Pahlavi Dynasty since the February 1921 coup which caused 
Reza Khan, later known as Reza Shah Pahlavi to become Shah of Iran. Seeking a Cold War ally 
which would offer Iran protection from Soviet expansion through the Caucuses and into Central 
Asia, Reza Shah aimed to unite economically with Washington after decades of only mild US 
involvement in Iran during the Qajar Dynasty. (Zirinsky, 1986) While Reza Shah intended to 
create a state which centralized power around the presidency, Iran’s Ulama (ءا%م%ل%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%ع), religious 
scholars and mullahs were a strong force in Iran and countered Reza Shah’s ambitions as being 
anti-Islamic.  (Faghfoory,  1987)  After  attempting  to  pacify  religious  leaders,  Reza  Shah 
determined  that  the  clerics  were  unreasonable  and  could  not  be  convinced  to  support  his 
autocracy. For this reason, Reza Shah in 1924 started to supplant traditional Islamic state laws 
with secular European law, and aggressively tried to limit and eliminate the ability of mullahs 
and clerics to influence state policy. (Akhtar, 1979) In marginalizing the Ulama, many clerics 
were exiled, imprisoned, or killed, as Reza Shah maximized his own power over the affairs of 
Iran. (Zirinsky, 1986)
Iranian State attempts to marginalize the influence of religious clerics and the role of 
Islam in State politics continued with Reza Shah’s eventual succession by his son Mohammad 
Reza Pahlavi in September 1941. After World War II, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi continued to 
marginalize the influence of Islamic clerics in Iran, which culminated in the White Revolution in 
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1963, which focussed on development of state institutions and further centralization of power. 
(Arjomand, 1988) (Watson, 1976) This further inflamed the frustrations of the Ulama, and then 
Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, a vocal critic of the Pahlavi Dynasty, Western influence in 
Iran,  and political  modernization.  Because of  his  views and his  vocal  criticism of the State, 
Khomeini was arrested and later exiled from Iran by Pahlavi in November of 1964. (Homan, 
1980) 
Through the late 1960s and 1970s,  Westernization increased exponentially in Iran,  as 
American influence became pervasive across major cities in Iran. (Sreberny-Mohammadi, 1990) 
(Chapin  Metz,  1987)  Motivated  by  Pahlavi’s  ineffective  rule  (Graham,  1978),  suspicion  of 
American  manipulation  of  Iranian  policy  (Rubin,  1980),  and  frustration  over  the  lack  of 
influence  that  Islam had  on  state  policy,  and  widespread  perception  of  corruption  (Mackey, 
1996), protests began to spring up in 1977. (Foran, 1994) Despite attempts to quell the rebellion, 
protests spread outside of Tehran in early 1978, and in February of 1979, after decades of Pahlavi 
leadership, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi fled the country as Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini 
returned triumphantly to take took authority over all state institutions.
Iran 1979 - Economic Factors
Prior to 1978, the Iranian economy under the Pahlavi dynasty was strong and grew at a 
faster pace than most other countries in Asia. (Hakimian, 1999) With an aim of emerging from its 
pre-industrial past, under the leadership of Mosaddeq and President Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, 
Iran  embarked  on  a  national  development  campaign  which  aimed  at  developing  Iranian 
agriculture and industry in 1948. (Amirahmadi, 1999) (Bruton, 1961) In order to marginalize 
British control over Iranian production of oil, Iranian leaders voted to nationalize oil production 
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in 1951, and experienced abusive international sanctions by the British government for their 
decision. Despite this, Iran emerged as one of the strongest global exporters of oil in the 1960s 
and early 1970s. The production and export of oil surged in the early 1970s, making up 30-40% 
of the Iranian economy through the 1970s. (Amuzegar, 1992) As this happened, the construction 
and  manufacturing  industries  in  Iran  surged  as  well.  (CBIRI,  2007)  In  1976,  while  Iranian 
economic growth was at an all time high of 22%, the Iranian economy began to free fall into 
negative growth - bottoming out at -7% growth in 1978.  (Hakimian, 2007) This was partly due 34
to lack of substantive investment in important areas of the Iranian economy, the introduction of 
new OPEC regulations which slashed Iranian oil exports by 20% (Foran, 1994), and capital flight 
of up to $40 billion due annually by 1977. (Hakimzadeh, 2006) Because of this, and increased 
 See Visualization 2K34
VIS. 2K
   of  71 136
strikes by oil workers, in 1977, oil production slid from nearly 6 million barrels per day to less 
than 4 million per day. (Alizadeh et. al., 2000) These factors along with other longterm economic 
and social indicators were instrumental in providing those with idealogical, religious, or political 
differences with the Iranian State the necessary impetus to challenge it.
After the wave of development and oil nationalization which characterized the 1950s and 
1960s in Iran, Iranian GDP emerged among the strongest in the MENA region, and the strongest 
among developing nations.  (World Bank,  2016) From 1965 until  1972,  Iranian GDP growth 
stayed  a  strong  13.6%.  (Katouzian  &  Shahidi,  2008)  However,  along  with  other  economic 
indicators, Iranian GDP growth began to spiral downward in 1973, and by 1975, just three years 
prior to the revolution, GDP growth became negative, at -.32%. After a mild recovery in 1976, 
GDP growth plummeted to its lowest ever rate of -12.84% by 1978.35
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The meteoric descent of Iranian GDP was mirrored by other economic factors in Iran 
during the late 1970s. In 1977, consumer prices in Iran rose by a striking 16% in 2 years. As 
population growth continued to increase, housing prices in Tehran and other metropolitan centers 
around Iran rose by 200% in 1977 alone. (Foran, 1994) Despite its status as the second largest oil 
exporter at this time, Iranian GDP growth broke with global positive growth and began declining 
in relation to its regional neighbors, Western countries, and other developing countries. (Ghadar 
& Sobhani, 2011) (Esfahani & Pesaran, 2009) This rapid inversion in GDP growth, and the fact 
that it was not shared by other nations regionally or otherwise led influential Iranians to conclude 
that  the  contraction  in  GDP growth  was  a  result  of  executive  mismanagement  and  further 
enflamed their frustrations with the increasingly illegitimate Pahlavi government. (Esfahani & 
Pesaran, 2009)
In the decade preceding the revolution in 1979, Iran’s population grew steadily by 3.1%, 
roughly average with other MENA and developing states. (Elkan, 1977) (World Bank, 2016) In 
the 1970s, large numbers of Iranians were employed in the oil, manufacturing, and agricultural 
sectors, and urban unemployment was low. (Elkan, 1977) (Amuzegar, 1992) Specific information 
regarding national unemployment in Iran through the late 1970s was suppressed by the central 
government,  and for that  reason, reliable broad statistical  data doesn’t  exist  for much of the 
1970s.  However,  it  is  generally  accepted  that  due  to  consistent  growth  in  agriculture, 
manufacturing, and construction, Iranian unemployment just prior to the 1979 revolution was 
quite low. (Amuzegar, 1992)
As Iran’s  economy grew through the 1960s,  inflation stayed consistently  around 2%. 
Starting in the mid-1970s, inflation began to rise precipitously, to 14.24% in 1974, and 27.28% in 
1977,  eclipsing rates  in  all  MENA and developing states  globally.  (World  Bank,  2016)  The 
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exponential growth of Iranian inflation during this time was attributed to massive government 
spending on social subsidy programs, and the implementation of the 5th Five-Year economic 
reform  and  development  plan  (FYDP).  (Looney,  1985)  “In  order  to  reduce  the  country’s 
dependence on oil and gas and diversify energy supply, the 5th FYDP calls for the optimization 
of production and an increase in power plant efficiency, reducing waste and development of 
Combined Heat and Power. (LSE, 2009)” (Hashim, 2012) Acting to curb the rampant growth of 
consumer prices, the Pahlavi government sought to inject oil revenues into the national economy, 
however, this strategy exacerbated the issue, and the economy only momentarily recovered in 
early 1978, but this recovery came too late. (Looney, 1985) (World Bank, 2016)
By 1976, Iran’s debt was pilling up, and it had already defaulted on nearly $4 billion in 
debt payments due in part to the devaluation of the Rial, and excessive international borrowing in 
the early 1970s. (Foran, 1994) (Pesaran & Esfahani, 2008) Wanting to be deeply integrated with 
the rest of the developed world, Iran invested billions of dollars into trade deals with the US and 
other nations, in the hope of developing deep ties. (Bigelow, 1979) After 1975, due to the impact 
of increasing political instability, economic data was suppressed or made unavailable in Iran, 
despite continuing to default on international debt responsibilities. (Amuzegar, 1992) (D.J. 1979) 
For this reason, it is unclear if the Pahlavi government was able to remedy the debt crisis that 
began in 1975 prior to the outset of the 1978 riots that resulted in the revolution. It is known, 
however,  that  in  1977,  due  to  mounting  pressure  due  to  imbalanced  nation  budgets,  Iran 
approached 11 American and European banks for a $500 million loan in order to balance the 
national budget. Furthermore, in order to support their nationalized mining industry, in 1978 Iran 
requested  an  additional  $450  million  in  US  loans.  Iranian  national  borrowing  became  so 
imbalanced that an international audit of the Central Bank of Iran concluded that the bank “had 
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only $215 million in capital and reserves, less than half the value of loans received from Western 
banks”. (Gerth, 1981) Rather than pacifying the Iranian populace, the restriction of economic 
data likely lead to a furthering and deepening of the already entrenched belief that the Pahlavi 
government was illegitimate and that they were trying to shield a corrupt and broken government 
from scrutiny and tumult. 
In the years between 1966-1976, Iran’s tax revenues increased by 77% - more than any 
other  developing  nation  in  the  same period,  due  in  part  to  the  expansion  of  still-privatized 
portions of the oil industry. (Tait, Gratz, & Eichengreen, 1979) Despite this increase, Iran’s tax 
rate increased from 21.6% of GNP to 32.7% in 1976. Furthermore, between 1974 and 1978 tax 
revenue increased from 5.41% of GDP to nearly 9%, an increase of nearly 164% in only 4 years. 
(World  Bank,  2016)  In  previous  times  of  economic  difficulty,  the  Iranian  government  had 
attempted to levy new taxes on its citizens, hoping that a presumably quiescent public would 
willingly take up economic responsibility for national irresponsibilities. (Chapin Metz, 1987) In 
1963,  in  order  to  make up for  a  $300 million deficit,  the  Iranian government  levied a  new 
taxation regimen for  heating kerosene and other  domestic  fuel  sources.  Almost  immediately, 
protests began, as the Iranian public flexed its ability to compel its national leaders. (Haliday, 
1979) Learning from previous experiences, as domestic frustrations rose in major cities across 
Iran, Iranian leaders began cutting income tax rates and investing heavily in social assistance 
programs, hoping to pacify the public. (Chapin Metz, 1987) These final steps in 1977 were seen 
by most as last desperate measures, and measures which only deepened the economic crisis faced 
by the country. 
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Iran Case - Social & Judicial Factors
In pre-revolutionary Iran, the Shah sat as the monarch of the Iranian State, and as such, 
had considerably more unchecked institutional power than he would if Iran had been democratic. 
(Zamahani, 2011) Prior to the revolution, the bureaucratic system in Iran was seen as serving the 
polity,  and  as  such  was  seen  as  being  highly  influenced  and  motivated  by  the  Pahlavi 
administration.  (Bill,  1972)  Corruption  near  the  outset  of  the  revolution  increased as  public 
servants  and  politicians  perceived  more  latitude  to  exploit  the  contracting  power  of  the 
government for their own benefit. (Gillespie & Okruhlik, 1988) Furthermore, prior to the outset 
of revolution, political persecution and imprisonment were often responses to criticism or when 
citizens, scholars, or politicians acted against unofficial government censorship. (Milani, 2012) 
By 1977, corruption in Iran was so pervasive that it was said to be “the glue that held the Pahlavi 
Dynasty together (Afary, Anderson, & Foucault, 2005).” 
During  the  Pahlavi  dynasty,  judicial  reform and  development  were  central  priorities. 
(Enayat, 2013) The basis for judicial law in Iran was established in the the mid-700s, on Islamic 
thought and law. (Weiss, 2002) From the beginning of the Pahlavi Dynasty in 1925, great efforts 
were made to marginalize the influence and authority of the Ulama, and to develop Western-
inspired formal legal institutions. (Adel, Taromi-Rad, & Elmi, 2012) To this end, Reza Shah 
instituted  non-Islamic  judicial  courts  as  replacements  for  Sharia  courts,  and  put  in  place 
significant provisions to separate judges and courts from the influence of the clergy and the State. 
(Ameli, 2012) By the late 1980s, the majority of Iran’s traditionally Islamic courts had been 
replaced by Western courts, and the role of the Islamic Ulama had been significantly decreased. 
(Enayat, 2013) For this reason, while the judiciary in Iran was seen by most as being a stable 
arbiter of justice which was well-separated from the polity, its role as a replacement of traditional 
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Islamic courts was seen by many as a negative, and was a source of significant domestic friction. 
This is not to say that Iranian courts were seen as entirely pure and uninfluenced. Quite to the 
contrary, in the 1970s, the role of civilian courts was often infringed upon by military and other 
civil service tribunals. (Graham, 1978) (Mohammadi, 2008)
While  the  Iranian  Imperial  Guard  was  seen as  advanced,  strong,  and well-developed 
during the later Pahlavi years, it was widely considered to be an apparatus wielded for the benefit 
of the State. Having been developed by the earlier Shah Pahlavi, the upper military ranks had 
been filled with officers which had been educated in Europe and widely had similar geopolitical 
persuasions as the Pahlavi Administration. (Ward, 2009) It is for this reason that it comes as such 
a surprise that the military responded in such a passive manner to the early 1977 protests and 
subsequent revolt which resulted in the ouster of the Shah. (Chehabi, 1998) In 1978, as riots 
escalated,  the  Shah  determined  again  to  wield  military  to  suppress  the  uprisings  across  the 
country.  To  this  end,  Pahlavi  instituted  martial  law,  banned  public  demonstration,  and 
aggressively suppressed the uprisings, resulting in more than 4,000 deaths. (Bill, 1978) By 1979, 
the intelligence and military apparatus in Iran was complex, and generally subservient to the will 
of  the Shah.  In the Iranian military,  the Shah governed rank advancement,  and ensured that 
fidelity to the Shah was centrally emphasized to rising officers. (Bill, 1979) With this and the 
lavish salaries and lifestyle that the Shah allowed for military leaders, he was able to buy the 
loyalty of the army, and supervise its strength, occasionally sacking officers who became too 
independent or developed political ambitions. (Zabih, 1988) Despite its strength and executive 
support of the Shah, in February of 1979, as senior military officers remained unified with the 
Shah, many members of the military which didn’t share the loyalty of their leaders deserted, and 
still others refused to fight. (Hashim, 2012) (Zabih, 1988) On February 11, after internal divides 
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made military unity impossible, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces declared neutrality 
and returned all troops to their garrisons, effectively sealing the fate of the Shah. (Arjomand, 
1985) (Hashim, 2012) (Nikazmerad, 1980)
As one of the last remaining absolute monarchs, the Shah’s authority and control over the 
political systems of Iran was nearly absolute. (Bill, 1979) (Wise, 2011) Often throughout the rule 
of  Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi,  if  a  political  party  became too strong or  voiced heavily 
dissenting opinions regarding the Shah’s leadership, the party was made illegal,  as happened 
with the Tudeh Party in the beginning of Shah Pahlavi’s rule, and the National Front Party during 
the revolution. (Foran, 1994) Through the later rule of the Shah, as the political scene in Iran 
became more polarized and militant to dissent, the national parliament, or Majlis became more 
internally contentious as law makers rose up against the repression of the Shah, and against the 
sham democratic institutions that the Shah governed. (Foran, 1994) (Mohammadi, 2008) As the 
Shah showed that he was willing to go to any extent to maintain control of the political narrative 
in Iran prior to the revolution, dissenting parties and politicians took to the streets to voice their 
outrage and distrust  of  the Shah.  These were the matchsticks that  would eventually enflame 
tensions across Iran and lead to the Shah’s ouster and exile from the country. 
American  foreign  aid  to  Iran  doesn’t  seem  to  give  itself  to  a  causative  or  even 
instrumental  argument  regarding  the  1979  revolution,  nor  does  it  seem  that  its  fluctuation 
influenced the outcome of the revolution positively or negatively. In 1972, the US Department of 
State allocated its final provision of foreign aid to the Pahlavi administration. Totaling just under 
$56 million, the provision of this aid to a nation who’s national budget totaled $4.65 billion was 
dismally low, and comprised only 2% of the US aid budget for 1972.  (USDOS, 2001) (USAID, 36
 See Visualization 2M36
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2013) Due in part to the fact that Iranian oil revenues were so high, American aid was deemed 
unnecessary, and was discontinue after 1972.  (USAID, 2013) (Mohaddes & Pesaran, 2013) It is 37
likely that due to the special strategic relationships that was enjoyed between Iran and the US 
during that time that there were considerable covert aid provided through the US Black Budget, 
which is classified even today.
 See Visualization 2N37
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Once  protests  erupted  in  major  cities  across  Iran,  American  leaders  began  trying  in 
earnest  to  stabilize the situation.  As protests  broke out  around the country in January 1978, 
Iranian leader paid little attention to them. However, by the time revolution was in full swing, it 
was far too late for the Pahlavi government to introduce reforms. From August 1978 until the 
following January, great reforms were made, under the advisement of American leaders, and new 
elections were called in an attempt to stall the fervor of revolters. (Harney, 1999) (Little, 2011) 
However,  beginning  to  change  this  late,  and  after  such  repressive  responses  to  early  revolt 
proved to be too little too late.
Into  1979,  US intelligence  and  Iranian  SAVAK worked  very  closely  to  monitor  and 
respond to domestic and regional issues which threatened their mutual interests. (Gasiorowski, 
2012) Even up until the 1979 overthrow of the Shah, the US was entering into weapons deals, 
including one for $9 billion in arms to be fulfilled from 1980-1982. (Wise, 2011) On January 4, 
just days before the official start of the revolution, and only a month prior to the demise of the 
Iranian monarchy, the US government sent General Robert E. Huyser, the head of US-European 
command as an advisor and as a sign that the US government was willing to support the Shah’s 
government even in the face of strong revolutionary forces in Iran. (Wise, 2011) (Hoyt, 1997) 
Through his mission and the entirety of the revolution, US officials continued to support the 
Pahlavi  government  and  share  intelligence  with  them  regarding  the  status  of  revolutionary 
leaders. In late January of 1979, it became increasingly clear that despite great effort, the Pahlavi 
government would fall, and the US government endeavored to prepare itself strategically for a 
transition  to  an  Islamist  government  led  by  Ruhollah  Khomeini,  the  spiritual  leader  of 
revolutionary forces. (Wise, 2011) These attempts to continue diplomatic and strategic relations 
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with  Iran  continued  after  the  Shah’s  January  16,  1979  flight  to  exile  from  Iran  until  the 
November 1979 Tehran Embassy crisis.
2.7 Libya 2011
The successful Libyan Revolution which forced the toppling and eventual extrajudicial 
killing of longtime strongman, Muammar Gaddafi, began as a result of both regional and national 
frustrations at autocratic dictatorship in the context of the Arab Spring revolutions. The 2011 
revolution forced the expulsion from power of Libya’s 42 year autocrat, and threw Libya into a 
time of civil conflict which, as of 2016, still rages on. Prior to the rule of Muammar Gaddafi, 
Libya was governed by monarchs which were established in the wake of the Italian defeat in 
World War II. (Alexander, 1981) Having emerged after World War II from decades of colonial 
rule, first under the Ottoman Empire, and then under Italian rule, the powerful emergence of 
young Gaddafi as a national leader marked a new era of Libyan national history. After World War 
II, leaders in the UN declared Libya free of colonial leadership, and appointed Senussi Order 
leader  Idris  bin Muhammad al-Mahdi King of  the newly unified United Kingdom of Libya, 
officially establishing the independent state of Libya in 1951. (Metz & Library of Congress, 
1989) Under Idris’ leadership, Senussi tribal and religious priorities were made state policy, and 
power was entirely centralized in Idris and his Senussi compatriots. (Bearman, 1989) (Pargeter, 
2012) 
Perhaps due to the existentially  formed dues that  King Idris  owed to the West,  Idris 
opened newly-formed Libya to strong military, economic, and diplomatic relations with the West 
shortly after he gained power. Moreover, inspired by Western allies, Idris made the Libyan State 
a federal system, and continued to give the US and UK significant influence over the newly 
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developed  oil  industry  in  Libya.  (Vandewalle,  2012)  As  an  opportunistic  response  to  deep 
Western ties, and internal political rivalry, power was seized in 1969 by the RCC, a group from 
whom Gaddafi would emerge as leader. (Be’eri, 1970) 
From the time Gaddafi came to  power,  his  foreign and national  policies  reflected an 
intense distaste for the West, staunch support for the development of Pan-Arab identity across the 
Arab world, and strong autocratic rule. (Schnelzer, 2016) Moreover, during his rule, Gaddafi was 
known for his disregard for the rule of law, corruption, nepotism, and suppression of civil rights 
for Libyans. (Obala, 2011) (Busuttil, 2011) After more than forty years of corrupt, authoritarian 
leadership, spurred forward by the earliest successful revolutions of the Arab Spring, in January 
of 2011, mass protests arose in major cities around Libya. Despite attempts by Gaddafi to quell 
the unrest,  the protests  grew into the summer until  they engulfed the country.  (Middle  East 
Reporter,  2012)  After  Gaddafi  began  a  massive  repression  and  torture  campaign  against 
revolters, a cohort of NATO and other nations intervened to incapacitate the military capacities 
under Gaddafi in late 2011. (Daalder & Stavridis, 2012) After nearly a year long insurrection, 
and more than 9,000 deaths, Libya’s longtime dictator was pulled from his hiding place in a 
drainage ditch near the city of Sirte, and subsequently killed by revolutionaries. The late October 
2011 death of Gaddafi did not represent the end of Libyan civil violence, and the beginning of 
peace  and  stabilization.  Quite  to  the  contrary,  this  event  marked  the  beginning  of  a  nearly 
decade-long time of internal fighting and civil war between factions vying for power over the 
Libyan State. (Elkatawneh, 2013)
The Libyan economy prior to the 2011 revolution was significantly affected, much like its 
neighbors’ economies, by the finding of oil. Oil was found in Libya in 1959, just a decade prior 
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to  the national  takeover  in  Gaddafi’s  bloodless  coup.  (St.  John,  2008)  In 1969,  upon taking 
control  of  Libya,  Gaddafi  ordered  the  drafting  of  a  new  national  constitution,  and  the 
nationalization of banks and hospitals, and the oil industry. (Vandewalle, 1998) Emerging from 
its agrarian past, the Libyan economy began developing at a rapid rate during the early 1960s, 
driven heavily  by revenues  from oil  exports.  (Heitmann,  1969)  (Clarke,  1963)  Much of  the 
economic  stability  which  was  inherited  by  Gaddafi  in  1969  was  a  product  of  this  oil 
development, and enabled him to maximize the centralization of power and national resources in 
himself and his friends. (Twist, 2013) As Gaddafi marshaled national resources to build massive 
private  estates  for  himself  and  to  encourage  Pan-Arab  identity  across  the  Arab  world,  the 
majority of Libyans lived in poverty.  (Mitchell,  2011) (Neto, 2014) The economic legacy of 
Gaddafi’s 40 year rule is one of great rural economic inequality and is defined by squandered 
opportunity.
Libya’s GDP growth was exponential shortly after the finding of oil, with a 42% increase 
in GDP between 1966 and 1967. (El Mallakh, 1969) However, by the year 2001, battered by 
years of international sanctions and large scale corruption, annual Libyan GDP growth fell to 
-1.76%. Endeavoring to prop up the failing economy, in 2003 and 2005, Gaddafi instituted a 
series  of  wide-ranging  economic  reforms  focussing  on  supplying  greater  resources  to  the 
development of agriculture, and decreased regulation on businesses. (IMF, 2005) (Masoud, 2013) 
This  development  was  undergirded  by  the  finding  of  significant  oil  reserves  near  the 
Mediterranean, which further supported the increase of Libyan GDP during this time, (St. John, 
2008) Despite wide ranging reforms, and the influx of greater oil revenues, just after 2005, GDP 
growth began a steady decline from 11.8% to -.79% just a year prior to the outset of revolution. 
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From 2005 until its low point in 2009, Libyan GDP growth was among the lowest in the MENA 
region, and was lower than average for all other global middle income states.38
Between  1980-2005,  Libya’s  population  surged  under  92.3%  growth  rates  over  the 
preceding 30 years. (Jelili, 2012) Between 1980 and 2010, Libya’s population nearly doubled 
from 3.078 million to 6.04 million in 2010. (World Bank, 2016) This factor in combination with 
rising corruption led to an incredibly high level of unemployment from the mid-1990s until just 
prior to the outbreak of revolution. In fact, as of 2006, nearly 20% of the adult population was 
unemployed,  and  over  50% of  the  youth  population  was  unemployed.  (World  Bank,  2016) 
(Ronen, 2008) Libya’s issues with joblessness are difficult to assess on a long term temporal 
scale, as much of the necessary information is unavailable. However, scholars have suggested 
that Libya’s continuous issues with unemployment were a product of an extended attempt to 
suppress inflation rates. (Fargani, 2013) This is a trend that is seen among poorer Arab countries, 
but is accentuated in the case of Libya. (Al-Habees & Abu Rumman, 2012) 
 See Visualization 2O38
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Starting  in  1991,  the  earliest  year  for  which  data  is  reliably  available,  the  Libyan 
unemployment rate stood at 18.8%, nearly the highest in the MENA region. Through the late 
1990s, unemployment continued to soar until it reached its record high of 19.7% in 2002 and as 
much as 30% in 2003.  (Vandewalle, 2012) (Sullivan, 2009) Driven by a huge push for external 39
investments  in  Libya,  360  foreign  corporation  were  allowed  by  Gaddafi’s  government  to 
establish operations in Libya during the early 2000s. (Sullivan, 2009) Furthermore, Gaddafi’s 
government  allowed for  Libya’s  oil  exploration  industry  to  be  slowly  opened up  to  foreign 
competition,  increasing  job  opportunity  for  many  Libyans.  As  a  result  of  these  liberalizing 
policies, in 2004 Libya’s unemployment rate began dropping back towards normal at a slow rate. 
By  2010,  however,  only  marginal  success  had  been  made  toward  decreasing  Libyan 
unemployment, and the official unemployment rate stayed stubbornly at 19.2%40
As a result of high unemployment and the influx of oil revenues, Libyan inflation from 
the mid-1960s until 2011 was relatively low, but fluctuated widely. When Gaddafi’s GPC took 
control of the Libyan government, inflation was low, at 0.39%, among the lowest in the MENA 
region and the world. (World Bank, 2016) From 1968 until the 2011 revolution, the inflation rate 
in Libya fluctuated widely, sometimes being as high as 29.3% in 1979 and as low as -9.8% in 
2002. Most often, inflation in Libya during this time fluctuated due to the effect of oil market 
fluctuation and the effect of international sanctions. (Vandewalle, 1998) Despite great economic 
tumult, high levels of corruption, and inconsistency in oil markets, from the early 1980s until the 
 Some historian suggest that the unemployment rate as of 2003 was as high as 30%, while the World Bank’s figures record a 39
19.7% rate for 1999-2003. In qualifying the World Bank’s data, I determined that multiple scholars supported the 30% figure, and 
determined to include it in this work for that reason. 
 See Visualization 2P40
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late 1990s, Libyan inflation experienced relative stability, only fluctuating between 1% and 11% 
during the decade. This era of relative stability was attributed to the development of intensive 
economic reforms and development goals that were instituted by the central government, and 
increased governmental spending on infrastructure and industry. This spending in effect injected 
nearly $63 billion into the Libyan economy, and resulted in a short-term stabilizing of Libyan 
inflation through the 1980s. 
In 1992, as a result of Libyan state support of terrorism, including the downing of Pan 
Am flight 103 and UTA flight 772, multiple countries and the UNSC condemned, sanctioned, and 
embargoed Libya, forcing Libyan officials to invest more heavily in military and security, in the 
absence  of  international  assistance.  (Franssen,  2002)  (UNSC,  2016)  This  caused  a  great 
fluctuation in inflation, to which the Libyan government endeavored to respond, with little effect. 
Just prior to the revolution, Libyan inflation stood at 15.5%, up from 2.8% in 2010. This rate 
represented the highest rate in the MENA region as well as the highest rate among global middle 
VIS. 2P
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income states. (World Bank, 2016) (2011, ايبي%%%%%%%%%%%ل دادعت%%%%%%%%%%%لاو ءاص%%%%%%%%%%%حلإا ةحلص%%%%%%%%%%%م) So, while in the 2000s, 
Libyan  inflation  was  at  times  as  low as  -9.8%,  its  unreliable  and  constant  changing  nature 
resulted in low consumer confidence, and national frustration over the constantly drifting value 
of national currency.41
Due in part to Libya’s history as a colonial enclave and its high revenues from oil, Libyan 
public debt was kept extremely low through the majority of the Gaddafi years. Because of its 
lack of public debt, Gaddafi was able to internally finance national development projects like the 
Great Manmade River project, which intended to bring fresh water from the interior of Libya to 
its coastal cities, for upwards of $25 billion. (Scholl, 2012) This lack of reliance on external debt 
accumulation allowed Gaddafi to provide consumer loans through the Libyan National Bank 
without interest to Libyan citizens, provide free utilities to many Libyans, and further helped to 
fuel the national economy through the 1950s to the late 1980s. (Fisher, 1953) (Chengu, 2014) 
Into the 1990s and early 2000s, the economic situation in Libya worsened slightly. Due to early 
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American and other embargoes on Libyan goods, and travel restrictions from many European 
and Western countries, tourism travel to Libya was drastically diminished in 1986. Furthermore, 
the Italian government called $5 million in outstanding debt held by Libya, and ordered the 
freezing  of  Libyan  assets.  (Hufbauer  et.  al.,  1990)  (LA Times,  1986)  In  general,  the  time 
preceding the 1990s in Libya were times of great expansion and development economically, but 
represented the beginning of economic instability and frustrations from Europe. (St. John, 1986) 
As  Libya  marched  into  the  2000s,  economic  tumult  decreased  in  general,  as  the  Gaddafi 
government did its utmost to reestablish its economic stability.  (Huliaras,  2001) By the time 
revolutionary forces took hold of Libya, Libyan foreign debt stood at only 2.6% of Libyan-held 
foreign assets in 2010. (AFDB et. al., 2012) 
Despite the consistent tumult of varying inflation and unemployment, partly because of 
oil revenues, Gaddafi was able to keep taxes both for consumers and companies relatively low 
through the later years of his reign. The Libyan State didn’t depend heavily on taxes due to oil 
revenues, and for this reason, tax collection was not well implemented. (Ozor, 2015) For this 
reason, even into the early 2000s, the majority of Libyan citizens were not required to pay taxes, 
and given the offering of zero interest government loans, were not obviously concerned with the 
status quo. 
Libya Case - Social & Judicial Factors
The late Gaddafi government was one which was characterized by rampant corruption 
and  nepotism.  (Hitman,  2016)  During  his  rule,  Gaddafi  was  known  to  manipulate  public 
perception by ordering crackdowns on lower-level corruption, while fostering it in the highest 
levels  of  government.  (St.  John,  2008)  Furthermore,  in  an  analysis  of  global  and  regional 
corruption, the Gaddafi government was ranked in 2010 among the most corrupt governments in 
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both  the  MENA region  as  well  as  the  world.  (Transparency  International,  2010)  Gaddafi’s 
personal involvement in funding rebellions, and funneling guns to insurgencies around the world 
furthered both domestic  and international  perceptions of  Gaddafi as illegitimate and corrupt. 
(Bøas & Utas,  2013)  In  part  as  a  result  of  decades of  rampant  corruption and funneling of 
billions of dollars from the State Treasury to personal accounts, perceptions of corruption played 
a great role in the developing of the 2011 Libyan revolution. (Graycar & Prenzler, 2013)
Having been established on the basis of separation between religious and secular law, the 
Libyan judiciary was heavily influenced by Islam when Gaddafi took control in 1969. (Metz, 
1989) Through his rulership, Gaddafi had endeavored to merge the influence of the two court 
systems, but these attempts were met with stern resistance due to the resulting perception of 
decreased influence of Sharia courts under Gaddafi’s unified system. (ICJ, 2016) By the time the 
2011  revolution  erupted,  Libya’s  judiciary  was  well-developed  and  was  widely  seen  as 
trustworthy. (Dunne, 2011) After structural judicial changes in 1971, the Libyan judiciary was 
structured  to  accommodate  a  multi-level  system of  courts,  with  the  Supreme Courts  as  the 
highest court, appellate courts, and regional courts presiding over smaller affairs. (Metz, 1989) 
Due to purposeful insulating, Gaddafi and his inner circle sat firmly outside of the jurisdiction of 
the courts. By instituting councils which superseded the laws of the courts, and filling them with 
political allies, Gaddafi was able to further distance himself from the facade of corruption, while 
fertilizing it internally. (Government of the Netherlands et. al., 2014)
Libya’s  legislature  was  organized  under  the  principles  described  in  Gaddafi’s  Green 
Book, a book describing Gaddafi’s preferred direct democratic system, controlled by the nation’s 
General  People’s  Committee.  (al-Gaddafi,  1976)  Under  Gaddafi’s  government,  legislative 
authority was divided between three levels of government: the 2,700 member regional General 
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People’s  Congress,  the  Fundamental  Popular  Party,  and  the  executive  General  People’s 
Committee. (Vandewalle, 1998) Appointed representatives from the legislature were not able to 
unionize  or  form parties  from 1972  onward.  (UNILO,  2010)  (Chivvis  et.  al.  2012)  During 
Gaddafi’s rule, free elections were not held - all ministers and representatives in both the FPP and 
General People’s Committee were instead appointed by loyal ministers in order to maintain a 
singularity of political authority. (Kjaerum et. al. 2015) Representatives could be named to the 
Congress through election, however they were required to be confirmed by the higher houses of 
the  legislature,  effectively  eliminating  the  chance  for  opposition.  The  controls  that  Gaddafi 
implemented  on  the  judiciary  and  legislature  in  Libya  essentially  eliminated  institutional 
opposition and allowed for the great centralization of power in Gaddafi and his closest allies.
Libya Case - American Interventional Response
Prior to the 2011 revolution, Libyan military personnel numbered near 80,000. (Hackett, 
2011) However, because the majority of Libyan military forces were conscripts, a great number 
of units deserted after the 2011 revolution began. Furthermore, because of the size and lack of 
professional leadership of the military, major portions of the military became virtually unusable 
in responding to uprisings and eventual bombardment by NATO forces. (Haddadt, 2011) As part 
of the overall national consolidation of power, Gaddafi had centralized power over Libyan armed 
forces on himself, due to repetitive attempts to mount coups against him. (Gaub, 2012) (Haddadt, 
2011) Because of prior embargoes on the sale of military technology by the majority of Western 
nations,  the  regular  Libyan  military  was  generally  under-supplied  at  the  time  of  the  2011 
revolution. (SIPRI, 2011) This in conjunction with an overwhelming response by NATO allies 
and the unwillingness of other Arab states to come to his aid was partly responsible for the 
overthrow of the Libyan government. 
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Libyan State  relations  under  Gaddafi were  described  as  heavily  strained  in  the  Arab 
world,  and even more so with the West.  After  years of  icy tension due in part  to Gaddafi’s 
funding of terrorism and anti-Westernism, Gaddafi’s approach to the West softened and he agreed 
to make reparations to the families of Lockerbie victims, and made a decided turn away from the 
production of nuclear arms in 2003. (Hirsh, 2006) Before this time, and since 1964, the US sent 
no foreign aid to Libya. However, starting in 2006, the US began providing federal funds in 
order  to aid in the decreasing of  Libyan nuclear  armaments and to convert  them to civilian 
energy production apparatus. (USAID, 2016) During this time, and prior to the 2011 revolution, 
no development or military aid was provided to Libya apart from what was provided for energy 
use.42
On March 17, 2011, after over a month of violent crackdowns on Libyan revolters by the 
Gaddafi government, the UNSC passed Resolution 1973, paving the way for one of the largest 
transnational action of foreign intervention since World War II. (UNSC, 2011) As one of the 
supporting members of the actions, the US aided in approving the implementation of an enforced 
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no-fly zone over Libyan airspace, freezing of international assets, further embargoes, strategic 
bombings of Libyan air defenses, and in some cases, the use of small special operations forces to 
protect  civilians  from government  aggression.  After  nearly  8  months  of  intervention,  and  a 
significant  suppression  of  Libyan  military  capacities,  Gaddafi’s  forces  broke  entirely,  and 
Gaddafi fled, was caught,  and immediately executed by rebels,  thus ending the 2011 Libyan 
revolution. While not a unilateral response, the 2011 American involvement in Libya’s revolution 
represents  the  largest  American  military  and  economic  intervention  of  the  Arab  Spring 
revolutions. 
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3.1 Overview of Research Questions
 At the outset of this project, I asked four questions regarding American intervention and 
aid to states experiencing revolution. The first, “To what degree does American foreign 
intervention and aid to Middle Eastern countries experiencing revolutionary activity influence 
the outcome of revolution or act as an indicator of American intention?” The goal of this 
question is to assess whether American foreign aid and intervention are important variables 
which have changed with the success or failure of revolutions. If American foreign aid and 
intervention effect the likely success of revolution, this has great implications for the meaning of 
American support to embattled leaders. If American support for embattled leaders is in fact 
correlated with revolutionary success, international leaders should be vigilant to do what they 
can to maintain a high level of American support in the future, particularly if they are 
experiencing significant levels of national popular protest. If American involvement is negatively 
correlated with the success of revolutions, American leaders should be highly vigilant to support 
leaders that they trust will act in the interests of the US in the long term. In terms of American 
intervention, involvement has often has had different aims. In some cases, US leaders have 
intervened to support a revolution, as was the case in Libya, and to a degree in Egypt, despite not 
preferring the toppling of Mubarak. What is at issue in these cases is not the intention of the 
intervention, but rather the result of the intervention. It is clear that American leaders choose to 
support certain leaders, not to support others, and to oppose others. The factor at issue on this 
study has been the outcome of that support, rather than its consistency across cases or its 
motivation.  
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 The second research question from Chapter I was: “once American leaders apply 
interventional pressure to attain a particular aim, do national leaders respond with reforms which 
conform to the interests that American leaders endeavored to achieve?” This question is intended 
to assess the strategic value of foreign aid and intervention in achieving concessions from 
international leaders upon which American leaders assert pressure to reform their state policies. 
The answer to this question is essential, because it allows for the establishment of an orthodoxy 
pertaining to the ability of American leaders to influence foreign leaders and export progressive, 
democratic American values to other nations in an interest of promoting enhanced human rights, 
democratic representation, or other important freedoms to national publics abroad.  While the 43
international engagements of American administrations in the early 2000s have made very clear 
indications regarding the futility of efforts to export Western democracy, this question’s answers 
will help to inform whether the rejection and failure of this exchange is due to the nature of the 
recipient society, or if it is a rejection of a larger group of ideals identified as foreign, American, 
Western, or imperialistic.  
 “When American aid is distributed for the purpose of developing good governance in a 
pre-revolutionary state, or US leaders decide to intervene in physical, diplomatic, or 
multinational ways, does it have a sufficient impact to stop the revolution or to increase overall 
stability?”. This question is much like the second question, but unlike the second, it does not 
analyze the individual results of American attempts to induce reform. Rather, it seeks to identify 
if these efforts have a discernible impact on the outcome of the revolution. In this way, the third 
 It deserves to be stated that these values are not ends unto themselves, but rather strategic shortcuts to enhanced relationship 43
and influence. Time has shown through US involvement in Europe after World War II, and in cases around the Middle East that if 
American leaders can engineer or hasten the development of mutual interest, shared values, and mutually constitutive identity, US 
leaders will be more capable of influencing and controlling the prerogatives of foreign states. 
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question continues where the second question stops, and seeks to identify what impact the 
potential reforms have on the outcome of national turmoil. As with the second question, this one 
assumes that aid is indeed given to governments experiencing turmoil, and seeks to identify 
whether the provision of foreign aid dollars for the sake of developing stronger judicial 
institutions, government auditing offices, and economic infrastructure, results in stability in the 
face of popular revolution? The answer to this question promises to offer direction to American 
policy leaders regarding how to strategically respond to future revolutionary violence in order to 
secure a conclusion which serves or promotes American interests.  
 The final research question that I posed in the first chapter relates to the foundational 
assumptions about the causes of revolutions which have been established in the comparative 
politics field for the majority of the modern era. This question seeks to know “to what degree are 
the orthodox assumptions regarding drivers for revolutions supported in cases of modern 
revolutions?” This question seeks to test and qualify the set of assumptions regarding the causes 
of revolutions, and endeavors to parse out which among them may be most motivating for early 
revolutionary activity. While these factors are well established in the literature, the analysis of 
these factors in comparison to each of the surveyed case studies subordinates this project under 
the wealth of research which has been conducted on the topic. Furthermore, the answer to this 
question will allow for a clear understanding of which areas of concerns among the five 
supported by Jack Goldstone were most influential in the aforementioned cases, and will aid in 
the establishment of a basis for further understanding of the causal drivers of revolutions in the 
Middle East. 
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3.2 Overview of Cases - American Intervention
Syria 1982
The case of Syria’s 1982 revolution is unique in that it shows the capability of a nation to 
exact its punishment on dissenters without the impact of American foreign policy intervention. 
The 1982 Syria case represents a polar non-interventional revolutionary narrative on the part of 
the American government. Despite the fact that the US had motive to support rebel groups in 
Syria due to their strong Soviet alliance (Breslauer et. al., 1990), and arguable had the strategic 
capacity  to  stop  Assad’s  assault,  or  punish  him for  his  aggression,  American  response  was 
imperceptible. While it  has been suggested that American forces supported revolters in Syria 
through covert programs, reliable information isn’t available to support this notion. 
 Capitalizing on opportunity to speak out on totalitarian aggression against democratic 
protest could have achieved for US leaders an enhanced moral high ground against Soviet allied 
states. Furthermore, it would also allow for a significant reduction in the level of influence that 
Soviet leaders enjoyed in the Middle East. While American comparative power during the 1982 
revolution was virtually unmatched during the revolution, the threat of war with the USSR was 
high. An American intervention in this comparatively insignificant revolt in Syria would serve 
some American interests, but the strategic payoff of toppling the Assad regime was certainly 
insufficient to warrant risking almost certain war with the Soviets. The 1982 Syrian revolution 
provides  preliminary  support  for  the  central  hypothesis  of  this  work,  but  more  than  this,  it 
provides evidence that American leaders balance calculations of their comparative power with 
calculations of the strategic context in determining whether or not to intervene in revolutions. 
Furthermore,  it  suggests  that  strategic constrain is  either independently important  as its  own 
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indicator  of  intervention,  or  is  a  significant  indicator  of  actual  relative  power.  Moreover,  in 
situations wherein American leaders have the capacity, motive, and opportunity to respond, but 
choose not to because of competing interest, or because of strategic or political limitations, it 
seems likely that national leaders will perceive this as a signal that they will not be strongly 
opposed by US or other Western forces. 
 An initial  inspection of  the  Syria  case  suggests  that  without  the  threat  of  American 
diplomatic or military intervention, central governments will be empowered and more likely to 
suppress revolt in their country with great force, knowing that capable American leaders have 
determined to do nothing to stop them.  While this point is interesting, it deserves qualification. 44
As mentioned in previous sections of this work, during the 1982 Hama revolution, American 
preference toward direct intervention was curtailed by the geostrategic environmental context of 
the Cold War. In this case, American leaders were constrained by the fact that intervention would 
mean almost certain direct war between the Soviets and Americans, shattering the tenuous peace 
which had been maintained until that time during the Cold War. Despite its superficial support 
for the hypothesis of this work, a deeper analytical scrubbing of the case study which accounts 
for the impact of American constraints shows that American decision to not intervene was less a 
product of motive and more a product of geostrategic calculation. With this caveat, this case does 
lend meager support to the important role that the absence of American intervention can have in 
the calculus of dictators who are interested in wiping out a revolt. 
Egypt 2011
 Prior to the unsuccessful Egyptian revolution of 2011, American foreign aid to Egypt 
was among the highest in quantity in the world. Shortly before the revolution, American aid to 
 As is mentioned in chapter one, media coverage, new administration, increased popular outrage, and other factors can change 44
the willingness of American leaders to respond. 
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Egypt decreased by 20% nearly to its lowest point in 35 years, as mentioned in Chapter Two. 
Furthermore, after the 2011 revolution, American foreign aid to Egypt remained at its low point 
until American leaders finally removed all military and economic aid to Egypt after the 2013 
coup which installed military leader Abdel Fattah el-Sisi into power. As was found in the case 
study,  American  leaders  supported  the  rights  of  Egyptians  to  protest  against  their  national 
government, in spite of the fact that Mubarak had enjoyed many years as a strong ally of the US, 
and called for him to step down increasingly as the revolution continued. Starting only 3 days 
after protests began, American leaders sent clear signals to the Mubarak government that they 
were prepared to side with the democratic rights of protestors. (White House, 2011) As American 
leaders refused to back embattled Mubarak, and encouraged the representation of democratic 
rights, protestors successfully forced the ouster of Mubarak from power after a decades-long 
rule.
The choice on the part of American leaders to not support Mubarak in the face of national 
revolt  was  clearly  a  choice  motivated  largely  by  political  limitation  rather  than  American 
preference.  While  human  rights,  democracy,  and  other  values  were  important  to  American 
leaders,  administrations  were  perfectly  content  to  enter  into  multi-billion  dollar  trade  and 
weapons deals with Egyptian leaders for decades before Tarhir Square happened. While there 
were nearly silent directives through the years encouraging greater democratic representation of 
Egyptians,  these  calls  were  rarely  followed  by  any  reform  on  the  part  of  the  Mubarak 
government, and served more as a political proof of American values than a clear attempt to 
motivate reforms. When revolt began in Egypt in 2011, American leaders were constrained by 
their record of encouraging democracy around the world, and could not be seen by the American 
public  as  encouraging  anti-democratic  repression.  For  this  reason,  as  a  function  of  political 
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limitation, American leaders offered no support to Mubarak in his final days, reduced the amount 
of aid that the Mubarak government received, and when revolution began, stood behind their 
values to satisfy domestic constituencies rather than supporting an Autocratic old friend.
In this case, American decreasing of economic aid to Egypt during the time preceding the 
revolution does correlate with lack of support for the regime in power in Egypt. Furthermore, 
American calls for continued and increased democratic expression were connected to the initial 
success of the revolution, giving the revolution a greater sense of legitimacy and allowing it to 
maintain momentum through Mubarak’s short lived military crackdown. While the revolution 
had no staying power, due in part to the long history of military succession in Egypt, and highly 
politically connected military leaders, the initial success of the Tahrir Square revolution at least 
appears to support the notion that was established in the Syrian case: that the decision on the part 
of American leaders to not support embattled leaders is correlated with the success of revolution. 
Furthermore, the significant reduction of American foreign aid to the Egyptian government in the 
lead up to the revolution served as an indicator that US leaders intended not to support Mubarak 
in the revolution. These connections are loose at best though. While US leaders did refuse to 
outwardly  support  Mubarak  against  democratic  revolt,  this  was  more  a  product  of  political 
limitations  on the  part  of  the  Obama Administration than a  product  of  a  US preference for 
democratic  rights  over  a  continued  Mubarak  leadership.  Furthermore,  it  is  hard  to  classify 
American leaders’ response as having supported revolters wholeheartedly. It is clear, due to the 
longterm support from American leaders that Mubarak enjoyed, that US leaders took no issue 
with  his  totalitarian  way  of  governing.  Furthermore,  it  was  clear  that  American  leaders 
prioritized economic and military partnership over democracy. However, once democratic action 
began taking place, American leaders were required to support the rights of revolters outwardly, 
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despite inwardly preferring the maintenance of the status quo. For these reasons, the Egypt case 
gives support to the notion that American support does not indicate success of revolutions nor of 
leadership stability, but rather has little impact on the outcome of revolution, even among the 
greatest of strategic allies. However, in cases when American leaders refuse to outwardly support 
foreign leaders in the face of revolutionary activity, the success of revolution is more likely, 
regardless of the reason American leaders chose to not give support to the embattled leader. 
Furthermore, this and the Syria case suggest that an accurate assessment of American strength 
must  be  calculated  with  room  provided  for  the  impact  of  both  domestic  and  international 
limitations and geostrategic constraints on the motives of American leaders. 
Iran 1979
American  foreign  aid  to  Iran  was  nil  prior  to  the  revolution,  due  to  overall  Iranian 
economic stability. Therefore, in the case of Iran, American foreign aid was not a factor in the 
lead up to the revolution, or in its success. In the case of the 1979, American leaders supported 
the rule of the Shah, collaborating in defense, making trade deals, providing arms, and providing 
strategic support through US military advisors on the ground in Tehran. Having enjoyed decades 
of support from American leaders, Pahlavi was given more latitude to oppress the Iranian people 
with  very  little  protest  from American leaders.  Even less  than a  year  before  his  ouster,  US 
President Carter declared regarding US-Iranian relations, “We have no other nation on Earth who 
is closer to us in planning for our mutual military security. We have no other nation with whom 
we have closer consultation on regional problems that concern us both. And there is no leader 
with whom I have a deeper sense of personal gratitude and personal friendship (President Carter, 
1977).” Even until nearly the end of revolutionary violence, American leaders were in support of 
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Shah Pahlavi, and collaborated with Iranian military leaders regarding how to maintain the stable 
rule of the monarchy. 
Despite  American support  for  the Pahlavi  government,  it  violently  fell  in  1979.  This 
threatens to deal a substantial blow to the theory that undergirds this project. Despite having 
received a nearly unprecedented level of American support, and having undergone an extensive 
program of repression, Shah Pahlavi’s rule was cut short, and subsequently the special Persian-
American relationship was cut as well. While this has significant implications for the strength of 
this project’s theory, it exemplifies a central theme regarding international relations research. The 
political landscape of our modern world is complex and highly nuanced. As such, any case of 
revolution is complex and likely has a multi-causal root. While this theory certainly lends a great 
deal of understanding to the relationship between American foreign policy and revolutions, it is 
essential that these conclusions be hemmed in by the reality that the world is highly complex and 
that  no one theory will  fully  satisfy the explanatory deficit  that  exists  between events,  their 
symptoms, and their results. Furthermore, this case study structure represents a high bar which 
seeks to identify at what point the theory begins to break down. In this way, this case fully 
satisfies this project’s main directive in that it provides a case wherein the assumptions of this 
project do not narrowly or perfectly fit the historical narrative. 
An initial assessment of power in this context indicates that the Iranian Revolution from 
1979 should have failed. Using the other case studies of this project as indicators, Iran represents 
the  case  which  should  support  this  project’s  theory  most  strongly.  Prior  to  the  revolution, 
American leaders worked closely militarily, diplomatically, and covertly with Iranian leaders. 
Furthermore, the military of Iran was well-developed, well-funded, and strongly supportive of 
the Pahlavi Dynasty, having been the source of the Dynasty itself. Moreover, political power in 
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Iran was not heavily divided and the Shah held the lion’s share of institutional power over the 
country. Despite an overwhelming mass of power between the US and the Shah’s forces, and 
military superiority, the revolution rallied millions of Iranians in an overthrow which stunned 
world leaders. While a subsequent work could analyze the complex military, political, social, and 
global interactions which drove the success of the revolution, the most germane point to this 
work is that motive and comparative power balance will not always be sufficient determinants of 
success to justify intervention. American leaders chose in the context of the Iranian revolution an 
option that was based solely on a calculation of motive and comparative power, and neglected 
other variables that  were centrally impactful  to the outcome of the revolution.  This was not 
necessarily the result of an inaccurate calculation of power or motive, but rather the result of 
incalculable variables which should stand as a clear barrier to future American intervention in 
foreign  revolution.  This  Iran  case  shows  that  while  success  might  be  achieved  through 
intervention, even in the most perfect of cases, the result of revolt can remain unimpacted by 
American intervention.  Moreover,  when revolutionary outcome does not  adhere to American 
preferences, the impact can be greatly detrimental to American longterm interests, and can harm 
the capacity of American leaders to subsequently interact in a productive way in the region of the 
revolution, as it has impacted subsequent American influence in the Middle East.
Libya 2011
In much the same way as in the case of Iran 1979, prior to the 2011 revolution, Libya 
received  no  foreign  aid,  apart  from a  small  portion  to  help  them in  their  commitments  to 
denuclearize. For this reason, economic aid can not be considered to have been influential on the 
outcome of the revolution. Prior to the revolution, American leaders were hostile to Gaddafi and 
his government, both for the discord and anti-Western sentiment that he sowed in the Middle 
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East and Africa, and for the wholesale corruption with which he engaged with the rest of the 
world. Once revolutionary activity began, the US government declared the Gaddafi government 
entirely  illegitimate  (Colvin  & Bull,  2011),  and  launched  an  initiative  with  NATO allies  to 
paralyze Libyan defenses,  in  order  to  allow revolutionary forces  to  push him out  of  power. 
Furthermore, even after his overthrow, US allies hunted Gaddafi near his hometown of Sirte, and 
French pilots  bombed his  convoy East  of  the city,  rendering him entirely defenseless  to the 
onslaught of rebels who would eventually murder him in a drainage tunnel. In the case of the 
Libyan revolution of 2011, while there were no signals through aid, US support for revolutionary 
actors was directly influential over the outcome of the revolution. 
In the case of the 2011 Libyan revolution, American intervention was at a higher level 
than in any other case - to the point of funding and arming rebel groups, and providing air cover 
for their operations. (Hosenball, 2011) For this reason, the Libyan revolution case represents the 
opposing extreme of the Syrian 1982 case on the interventional continuum. During the Libyan 
revolution, the conclusion was bought and paid for by US leaders, and the major events of the 
revolution were orchestrated by US strategic leaders. Furthermore, it seems evident that without 
the influence of American and allied intervention, the revolution in Libya would have failed or 
been violently oppressed. This response marks the highest level of interventional involvement on 
the part of US leaders of any of the cases of Arab Spring revolutions, and may also represent the 
largest intervention in a sovereign revolution by American forces in history. 
The Libyan revolutionary case represents the impact of unfettered American motive and 
comparative power advantage. In the case of Libya 2011, it is arguable that American leaders had 
a similar level of motive to intervene in the revolution as they had in Syria 1982. Having never 
engaged directly in ground war against Libyan forces, not having any direct foreign relations, 
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and not being existentially threatened by Libyan military action, it  seems clear that the only 
motive American leaders had to intervene in the Libyan revolution was strategic. By allowing for 
the toppling of an anti-Western dictator, American leaders could reign in the anarchy spreading 
across North Africa, cement Egypt as the preeminent power in Africa, and show other Middle 
Eastern powers that they were willing to punish leaders who stepped out of line and impeded 
American interests. Furthermore, being a developing middle power in the Middle East, it was 
clear that American and allied firepower could easily overwhelm the capacities of the Libyan 
military  to  protect  its  valued institutions.  Due to  this  calculation of  comparative  power  and 
motive, and in the absence of international strategic constraint, American leaders intervened and 
crushed the Gaddafi government, allowing revolutionaries to overrun the country.
3.3 Findings
1. To what degree does American foreign intervention and aid to Middle Eastern countries 
experiencing revolutionary activity influences the outcome of revolution or act as an 
indicator of American intention?
In three of the four surveyed cases: Libya, Egypt, and Syria, government leaders were 
receiving no foreign economic or military aid from the United States, or the amount of aid being 
received was in significant decline at the time of revolution. In these cases, the downward change 
of foreign aid provision, or protracted withholding of foreign aid stood as an indicator of future 
waning support for the government, or for outright opposition to the central government in the 
face of revolutionary activity. In the case of Egypt, shortly after aid began to decrease to the 
Mubarak government, American leaders began supporting protestors and pressuring Mubarak to 
give up power. Furthermore, in the case of Libya, the application of economic pressure through 
the withholding of foreign aid, as well as the increase in sanctions prior to the revolution were 
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followed with a forceful anti-Gaddafi policy which led to his fall and ultimate death. Finally, in 
the  case  of  Syria,  after  continued  hostilities  over  the  establishment  of  the  State  of  Israel, 
American covert  operations,  and Syrian sponsorship of terror,  American foreign aid was not 
given to Syria prior to the Hama revolution. In this case, American leaders resisted the urge to do 
anything to support the oppressive response of Assad against his people in Hama, but also did 
nothing to secure a peaceful outcome. The Hama revolution stood as a potential massive threat to 
the Assad government and resulted in a pulling of Syrian troops from other regional engagements 
to secure the stability of the government. Despite this, US leaders determined to remain silent 
and not assist Assad in maintaining control.
In each of the surveyed cases, the reduction or withholding of American foreign aid to the 
national government of a pre-revolutionary state was correlated with future opposition to the 
continued rule of the embattled leader. The case of Iran is important to this conclusion because, 
as mentioned previously, American aid was dropped years prior to the revolution. Moreover, 
despite receiving a huge amount of other support from American leaders during the successful 
revolution, Iranian leaders didn’t receive an increase in foreign aid. This can be explained by two 
means. First, Iran stands as an outlier among otherwise under-developed, poor countries of the 
MENA region. In 1979, Iran’s wealth had for many years been amassing, and had not required 
the provision of American economic aid for that reason. Because of this, Iran’s greatest failings 
were  political  rather  than  economic,  so  the  impact  of  foreign  aid  would  be  marginal  in 
comparison to other forms of aid. Second, while Iran did not receive increased economic aid 
during the time of the revolution, US leaders continued to trade heavily with Iran and continued 
to  enter  into  massive  trade  deals,  including  a  $9  billion  deal  just  prior  to  the  end  of  the 
revolution. This level of transnational trade may very well have been sufficiently powerful to 
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respond to economic difficulties in Iran and may have lessened the need for or impact of US 
foreign aid in the pre-revolutionary context. The cases surveyed provide robust support to the 
preceding hypothesis that American foreign intervention and aid are strong predictors of the level 
of support that leaders can expect to receive from US leaders in case of national turmoil. 
In any case of revolution, it is likely that US-supported leaders will clamor for increased 
economic aid and political support, regardless of the level of support they initially receive. In the 
context of this project however, this fact is incidental. To this point, this project stands as proof 
that the level of support that leaders can expect to receive from American leaders in the case of 
national turmoil will likely be equal to the pre-revolutionary level of commitment they received, 
but will be highly impacted by the influence of the geostrategic and political context in which the 
revolution  occurs.  In  cases  wherein  American  leaders  have  motive  to  intervene  and  the 
geostrategic  risk  is  low,  American  leaders  will  often  support  their  preferred  actor,  whether 
revolters or standing governments to at least the same degree that they supported that actor prior 
to revolt. If, however, there are domestic or international constraints that affect American leaders’ 
calculus, embattled leaders or revolters are likely to only lukewarm rhetorical or covert support, 
regardless of the prior importance of the relationship between groups. This is likely due to the 
fact that American leaders recognize from experience that intervention in foreign revolutions has 
a high political cost, and isn’t always successful. Furthermore, American leaders have begun to 
recognize that their support for a revolutionary group or embattled leader doesn’t always dictate 
how the  revolution  will  progress  or  how it  will  end.  If  American  leaders  can  protect  their 
interests  by  giving  only  tacit  support  to  their  preferred  outcome,  either  outcome  will  be 
politically manageable to them.
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Finally,  in  one  case  (Egypt)  wherein  US  leaders  cut  off  previously  flowing  aid,  or 
decreased its  provision,  successful  revolution ensued.  In  one case (Libya)  in  which aid was 
previously  removed,  but  was  followed  with  direct  American  intervention,  revolution  was 
successful. In the other case (Syria), American leaders refused to respond in any way or support 
either side, and revolution was crushed.  Finally, in one case of successful revolution (Iran), 45
American  aid  was  removed,  and  American  intervention  grew  to  unmatched  levels.  Despite 
American support for the Shah, this revolution was successful, and the Shah was deposed.46
Finding: The impact of American intervention and aid on revolutionary states is nuanced and 
often dependent on the level of intervention applied. For states which receiving foreign aid from 
the US, foreign aid variation can act as an indicator of future US support in cases of national 
turmoil or revolution. However, variation in the level of intervention in the revolution is not 
reliably  correlated  with  success  or  failure  of  the  revolution.  If  American  leaders  choose  to 
intervene to the benefit of a government, it is not clear that the revolution will indeed fail or that 
the  likelihood  of  revolutionary  success  will  decrease  in  any  perceptible  way.  Quite  to  the 
contrary, American intervention on behalf of a national government does not produce a reliable 
result - in some cases the revolution succeeds despite the preponderance of power that American 
forces may hold in the conflict. If, however, American leaders determine to intervene on the side 
of revolters, or to simply tacitly support their aims, it is reliable indicator that the revolution will 
be successful. Thus, the ebb and flow of American intervention and aid is an unreliable indicator 
 The decision on the part of American leaders to not intervene in Syria was largely a product of strategic constraints which resulted 45
from Assad’s Cold War partnership with the USSR. This is important because it shows that strategic constraint is as much a factor in 
American decisions to intervene as capacity is. 
 This work does not make any intentional effort to parse out what causes revolutions to succeed in a national political context, as a 46
study of this would require a deep analytical assessment of each case. It is likely that this is a function of the stability of state 
institutions of power and the network centrality of revolt leaders among national publics. While this is certainly an important portion 
of revolutions, it is an area of study reserved for a deeper subsequent project.
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of success of revolution. However, the removal of aid, or its decrease to nations experiencing 
revolutionary  activity  is  a  reliable  indicator  of  future  US  support  for  embattled  leaders. 
Furthermore, the US government has actively used intervention and the provision of aid as a 
strategic tool in order to influence to result of revolutions.
2.  Once  American leaders  apply  interventional  pressure  to  attain  a  particular aim,  do 
national  leaders  respond  with  reforms  which  conform  to  the  interests  that  American 
leaders endeavored to achieve?
3. When American aid is distributed for the purpose of developing good governance in a 
state, or US leaders decide to intervene in physical, diplomatic, or multinational ways, does 
it have a sufficient impact to stop the revolution or to increase overall stability?
In cases of governmental instability during revolutionary activity,  the US government 
often does not increase foreign economic aid to embattled leaders in order to reform or to support 
development projects by the embattled leader. While American leaders could approve the release 
of aid dollars in order for foreign leaders to use towards massive and decisive reforms, American 
leaders do not do this. In fact, in both of the examples of revolution among friendly Middle 
Eastern nations, aid is not used to this end. It is possible that if American leaders were willing to 
do this, that they would be able to buy the allegiance of revolting publics and save embattled 
leaders from toppling. As it stands however, in all of the cases, foreign aid was not used for this 
purpose. It is entirely possible that funds were provided to leaders through US black budgets, but 
it  is  likely that  such funds would not  be sufficient  to invest  in the necessary developmental 
programs in order to stabilize support for the leaders.
As  was  concluded  previously,  American  leaders  use  aid  as  a  signal  of  future 
interventional  intent  and often have used intervention in an effort  to  impact  the outcome of 
revolutions.  The pressure that American leaders assert on foreign leaders is often used in an 
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endeavor  to  induce  governmental  change,  development,  or  reform  in  order  to  better  the 
circumstances of national publics, or to give publics the opportunity to choose a new national 
leader. In two of the cases surveyed, (Egypt and Iran) upon pressure from American leaders and 
their  national  publics,  leaders  have  chosen  to  announce  reforms.  This  however  has  been 
insufficient due to the fact that they come too late, or were too narrow to be impactful. In both of 
the cases wherein the US applied external  pressure in order to induce reform, reforms were 
announced by national leaders. In these cases, however, the reforms were insufficiently early or 
broad to slow or stop revolutionary activity, and the embattled leaders were swept from power. 
Finding:  In cases of revolution,  US leaders have not used the provision of foreign aid as a 
strategic tool to induce reforms in the recipient state. In some cases, US leaders have made calls 
for reform in the face of revolutionary activity. These calls for reform are often not heeded in the 
short  term,  but  are  thereafter  headed.  The effect  of  these  calls  is  insufficient,  however,  and 
leaders who choose to respond to US calls with efforts to reform do not survive revolution. 
4.  To  what  degree  are  the  orthodox  assumptions  regarding  drivers  for  revolutions 
supported in cases of modern revolutions? (Goldstone)
For each of the cases surveyed, four drivers of revolution were surveyed, and 11 subfield 
predictive indicators were surveyed as well. Once this was done, the values of each case were 
tallied for every factor and measured against  the other cases.  The conclusion of this  project 
supports the well developed orthodoxy surrounding the cause of revolutions. In all of the four 
cases, each causative factor had at least one subfield indicator that was highly impactful to the 
overall condition of the country. This means that in each case, as Goldstone asserts, some of the 
motivating factors of revolution were present and part of the causal story for the revolution.  47
 See Visualization 3A47
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Furthermore, in each of the four cases, the impact of the economic strain and political alienation 
factors were more significant than that of the other two factors.  In each case, there was a higher 48
level  of  instability  in  the  sections  relating  to  these  two  categories  than  in  the  other  two 
categories. While this may to some degree be a function of the availability and ease of measuring 
information in these categories, it seems intuitively clear that issues of economic instability and 
political alienation were to most impactful factors regarding the revolution. These case studies 
push forward Goldstone’s assumptions and indicate that economic strain and political alienation 
are the most acute drivers of revolution. In every case wherein revolutionary activity developed, 
 In this study, the comparative value can be seen in the proportion of drivers for each case predictive indicator which are 48
categorized as low in terms of observability in each case. 
VIS. 3A
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there was a high level of economic strain and political alienation. This may be due to the fact that 
the attributes and effects of these factors are highly visible and impactful to national publics, and 
may also be statistical  noise.  The case studies  which were surveyed in  this  project  strongly 
support the orthodox assumptions regarding the cause of revolt. In each of the surveyed cases, at 
least some of the drivers of revolution were present, consistent with Goldstone’s findings. This 
finding supports the previously held reality that revolutions are driven, at  least  in part,  by a 
combination of economic strain, political alienation, and governmental illegitimacy.
Finding:  Revolutions  are  caused  by  a  combination  of  economic,  political,  and  international 
factors. These factors are often present in cases of revolution to varying degrees, but are present 
in every case surveyed. In cases of pre-revolutionary states, the most likely drivers of revolution 
involves national economic difficulty and political alienation. 
3.4 Summary of Findings
 By applying theories of international relations to the case studies in this project, it can be 
seen that the modern Middle East revolutions affirm widely held beliefs regarding revolutions, 
furthers other theories, and provides a foundation for future research regarding the impact of 
American involvement in foreign revolutions. The initial question regarding the impact of 
American aid on the success of revolutions was answered with a clear and unambiguous no. It is 
clear from these case studies that the use of foreign aid as a tool to induce a particular outcome in 
foreign revolutions is not widely effective, and its effects are inconsistent. It is unclear whether a 
more robust, consistent policy on the use of foreign aid in cases of revolutions would provide 
more dependable or beneficial results. However, it is clear that in its current form, American 
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foreign aid is not used as such a tool. In some cases, the US chooses to lend its support to 
revolutions through a varied selection of interventional tactics. In cases where US leaders choose 
to support the standing government, the cases analyzed in this study indicate that revolution is 
most often less successful. Furthermore, in 3 of 4 cases wherein the US determined to support 
rebellion, the revolution was successful, and the standing national leader was forced from power. 
 A conclusion reached through this project is that as revolutions progress, the removal of 
aid, or its decrease to nations experiencing revolutionary activity is a reliable indicator of future 
US support for revolutionary factions. This is important to state leaders who are both recipients 
of American foreign aid and executives over a nation experiencing internal conflict. To these 
states, as American aid decreases, it is likely that American leaders will also support actors which 
may aim to overturn the government or impact its stability. Furthermore, despite its limited 
utility, American leaders have used the provision of aid as a tool to support or remove support for 
embattled national leaders, and this removal of support had correlated with the success of 
revolutions. 
 Regarding reform, US leaders often encourage foreign leaders experiencing internal 
opposition to reform and provide greater measures of security in the face of protest. In many 
cases, national leaders resist this urging until it becomes painfully apparent that not reforming 
will result in their necessary departure from power. While US leaders support the increase of 
reforms in nations experiencing violence, US leaders stop short of providing foreign leaders 
resources to provide for these reforms. Furthermore, once leaders decide to give in to US calls 
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for reform, it is often too late or insufficiently broad to impact the fervor of revolutionary 
factions in their nations.  
 Finally, this research supports the notions held in the orthodox view of the causes of 
revolution. Furthermore, it pushes forward those notions by prioritizing between them and 
showing that economic and political considerations are the most significant drivers of revolution 
among the five influential ones. Through this research, it is clear that national publics care more 
about the most obvious of national issues than those that are less salient or more nuanced. 
Furthermore, from this research, it is clear that economic issues are a great driver for revolutions, 
and that national publics will take these issues more seriously than others.  
In the modern world, American support for revolution is significant to the outcome of the 
revolution. Furthermore, for those states that receive foreign aid,  as US leaders decrease the 
provision of American aid, they signal a waning of support for state policies or leadership. It is 
important for states which receive aid to recognize that when aid is decreased during a time of 
economic or social instability, that national reform must ensue in order to have a dependable 
chance of surviving the potential of revolt.
Findings
1. The ebb and flow of American intervention and aid is an unreliable indicator of success of 
revolutions. 
2. The removal of aid, or its decrease to nations experiencing revolutionary activity is a reliable 
indicator of future US support for embattled leaders.
3. The US government has actively used intervention as a strategic tool in order to influence to 
result  of  revolutions.  It  has  not,  however,  used  foreign  aid  strategically  in  the  context  of 
revolutions.
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4. US leaders use rhetorical intervention as a mechanism to induce foreign leaders to reform. 
This reform is often insufficient and unreliable for the purpose of staving off revolution. 
5. When US-supported leaders are facing revolution, American leaders do not support them with 
increased foreign aid provision.
6. Revolutions are caused by a combination of economic, political, and international factors. 
These factors are often present in cases of revolution to varying degrees, but are present in every 
case surveyed.
7. In cases of pre-revolutionary states, the most likely drivers of revolution involves national 
economic difficulty and political alienation.
3.5 Identity and Power as Drivers of Intervention
In  the  American  field  of  international  relations  Social  Constructivist  scholars  like 
Alexander Wendt, Martha Finnemore, and Kathryn Sikkink have argued that identity and ideas 
matter in shaping the interests and interactions of states in the international system. (Wendt, 
1995) (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998) The preceding research indicates that this is to some degree 
true, that states will in some cases support outcomes which support their identities and values. 
More importantly, however, this study indicates that the power of ideas as a motivator towards 
intervention  is  strongly  hemmed in  by  the  influence  of  relative  power  and  the  geostrategic 
context in which those ideas exist. Through the cases surveyed in this study, it is clear that in 
cases wherein American leaders perceive a motive to intervene, and have the capacity to, they 
will intervene in revolutions in both friendly and hostile nations of the Middle East. Often, this 
intervention is at least marketed to Americans as being in support of democracy or other ideals 
that constitute a significant factor of collective American identity. However, this breaks down in 
the face of a complex geostrategic environment and in the face of an unaccommodating balance 
of power. While this conclusion doesn’t entirely discredit Constructivist claims regarding the 
centrality of identity in strategic calculation, it does qualify it. This study shows that while ideas 
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may matter, power and constraint seem to be the coin of the realm in foreign policy. In cases 
wherein US leaders have motive to intervene, superior comparative power, an ethical or moral 
argument to justify intervention, but a strategic environment which doesn’t support successful 
intervention,  threatens  important  domestic  political  positions,  or  threatens  an  escalation  of 
international tensions, American leaders will elect to not intervene, as was the case in Egypt and 
Syria. However, in cases wherein there is American motive to intervene, a justifiable argument, 
and no strategic  or  comparative power-based reason not  to  intervene,  American leaders  will 
intervene and endeavor to force the conclusion of the revolution to adhere to their preferences, as 
was the case in Iran and Libya. While this approach is well founded in American foreign policy, 
and among this project’s case studies, it is clear that the strategy employed by American leaders 
is not one who’s conclusion is predictable or even entirely beneficial to American interests.
3.6 Implications 
The implications of this project for policymakers,  state leaders,  and for academia are 
broad and pertinent to the future of international relations. The truths that this project asserts 
should be rigorously tested against other cases to verify their validity. Moreover, there is great 
opportunity in the future research on foreign aid, hegemonic intervention, and revolutions for the 
concepts to be refined and clarified. 
Implications for States Experiencing Violence
Regarding  state  leaders  which  are  experiencing  revolt  or  popular  unrest,  this  project 
implies that those leaders are likely better off to determinately oppress revolters or to flee the 
country in favor of sparing their own lives than to implement eleventh hour reforms. This is a 
conclusion  that  Shah  Pahlavi  reached  early  on,  realizing  that  reform would  only  embolden 
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revolters and would lead to his assassination, and a conclusion that Gaddafi realized after it was 
too late to flee. However, if revolutionary violence has gained any major popular support, and 
leaders are either unable or unwilling to respond with violence, it is unlikely that late reforms 
will turn the momentum of enraged citizens and cement their continued rule. This is not to say 
that embattled leaders should murder their own citizens in order to maintain their rule. Rather, 
this is to say that national leaders must be vigilant to respond to revolt, popular unrest, and any 
other form of organized protest in their states in a decisive way before these movements gain 
important momentum or popularity.  A late decision on the part of embattled leaders to reform 49
may be seen as a last desperate attempt to stave off revolution, as it was in the case of Iran and 
Egypt, and be met with a tidal wave of revolutionary fervor. In these cases, if the revolution has 
grown in sufficient size and momentum, any amount of reform will likely be insufficient to stop 
the revolution from happening. Referring back to Vis. 1C , it is essential that national leaders 50
are  aware of  factions in  their  own states  which are  gaining momentum and questioning the 
legitimacy of their leadership. As shown in Vis. 1C, if leaders catch these movements in their 
infancy, they are given the opportunity to make meaningful reforms which will undercut the 
frustrations of revolutionary actors, and will allow for their continued rule. It is unclear at which 
point the success of the revolution under these circumstances becomes inevitable, but it is clear 
that the best way to stop revolutions from becoming powerful enough is to make reforms early 
that respond to revolters’ demands in a clear and meaningful way. 
 This is particularly true if the unrest has gained momentum in major population centers. 49
 See Page 2150
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Regarding the same leaders, they should be wary of becoming dependent on American 
foreign aid as a resource, or as a stabilizer for their nation. In the past, American leaders have 
manipulated  foreign  aid  and  used  indirect  intervention  to  change  the  course  of  national 
revolutions in significant ways. Opening a door to that potential future influence is not certainly 
an advisable choice. This is not to say that American foreign aid and intervention absolutely will 
result in revolution or the deposing of national governments when there are revolts. It simply 
means that American leaders will not necessarily support the continued leadership of allies or 
longterm  friends  which  experience  revolutionary  activity.  This  refusal,  due  to  political 
calculations or geostrategic limitations, can often add to the difficulties of embattled leaders, and 
can  give  added  leverage  to  American  leaders  who may not  reliably  act  with  recipient  state 
leaders’ interests in mind, even when those leaders have enjoyed the closest of relationships with 
the  US  over  the  longterm.  Quite  to  the  contrary,  it  is  likely  that  US  leaders  will  call  for 
widespread reform which may result in the ultimate removal from power of the embattled leader.
In cases of revolution in the Middle East, revolutionary violence has been triggered by a 
deep domestic need to reform economic and political institutions. Looking into the center of the 
issue, American leaders have seen that these reforms are essential to the goal of increased good 
governance,  and  have  encouraged  the  swift  development  of  these  practices  in  the  outset  of 
revolutionary activity. In the future, states experiencing revolution would be well served to heed 
these American warnings and reform quickly and deeply in order to disqualify the frustrations 
that citizens are rallying behind. When national leaders stall,  hoping that revolution will  not 
come, their removal from power becomes more certain and more swift. This is not to say that 
economic  or  political  reform  will  stop  revolutions  every  time.  The  surveyed  cases  show, 
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however,  that  waiting to  reform until  it  is  absolutely necessary is  unadvisable,  and possibly 
deadly. 
States experiencing national turmoil should be aware that even nuanced US intervention 
impacts the success of revolutions. Whether it is because of covert operations which come with 
American  intervention,  because  of  the  influence  of  a  contrarian  hegemon,  or  because  of  a 
ideational power that American leaders hold in the minds of national publics, when American 
leaders choose to act, this often alters the course of revolutions. This impact is often entirely 
unpredictable, however, and should not be relied on as a weapon which can be wielded in the 
face of revolutionary violence. In some cases, this alteration is to the benefit of local leaders, but 
in  most,  it  is  not.  Furthermore,  when  US  leaders  choose  to  intervene,  the  less  direct  the 
intervention, the less predictable the outcome. Finally, when US leaders choose to act in support 
of  a  national  leader,  it  is  likely that  salient  intervention will  be seen negatively by national 
publics,  and this  action will  induce a greater  demand for  revolutionary change.  If  American 
leaders determine to intervene in some way, it is important to use that intervention for productive 
reform-based development which targets the central drivers of national turmoil. 
Implications for American Policy Leaders
In the past, American leaders have been a part of attempts to support dictators, have left 
other friendly dictators in the cold to be wrestled from power by revolters, and have mercilessly 
attacked other  dictators  in  campaigns  directed  at  removing them from power  with  alarming 
immediacy. In other cases, dictators have murdered massive numbers of their own civilians who 
were protesting widespread corruption and economic mismanagement,  and American leaders 
have chosen to turn a blind eye to the democratic rights of those civilians which were being 
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snuffed out. In some cases, this response has been the result of domestic political constraint, and 
in  some  cases  it  has  been  the  result  of  international  geostrategic  limitations  which  made 
successful intervention impossible. 
American foreign aid is a resource with great potential, but it is entirely un-utilized for 
motivating leaders to reform in favor of stability today. As American leaders give aid to foreign 
leaders, they can buy trust, development, and a slow emerging of democratic rights. More than 
being used for these purposes, aid is used as a punitive stick to punish leaders with which US 
leaders  disagree.  Aid,  however,  can  be  used  as  a  means  of  developing  independent  judicial 
bodies within states that broaden national power bases, and can further be used to respond to 
other significant issues that national publics cry out about. Furthermore, as publics revolt, aware 
foreign  leaders  can  develop  an  acute  sense  of  responsibility  to  respond  to  the  drivers  of 
revolution and may become more desperate for resources which will aid them in reforming as 
their  publics  would  like.  This  provides  an  open  door  through  which  American  leaders  can 
introduce packages of reforms which are undergirded with the promise of additional support 
from US leaders contingent on those development goals being implemented. 
American leadership in the Middle East has largely been led by national interest and an 
idealism that puts the promoting of democratic rights at the apex of foreign policy priorities. This 
priority  has  been  secondary  to  other  national  interests,  however,  as  dictators  with  whom 
American  leaders  share  a  strong  relationship  have  often  been  supported  despite  their  rigid 
opposition to democracy. However. American foreign policy has more often been a function of 
American  strategic  calculation  than  a  desire  to  see  the  spread  of  democracy.  Furthermore, 
American intervention has not produced results that support American interests, the interests of 
states  experiencing  revolt,  or  states  in  the  regional  periphery.  In  Egypt,  Libya,  and  Iran, 
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American  intervention  was  followed  by  a  contraction  of  democratic  rights,  and  increase  in 
regional and national instability as well  as a contraction of American regional influence and 
moral  authority.  This  dismal  record  of  failure  in  intervention  gives  itself  to  only  one 
recommendation: that American leaders get out and stay out of the business of manipulating 
revolutions and spreading democracy. While American leaders may calculate comparative power, 
their  motives,  and  geopolitical  context  well,  national  publics  have  on  numerous  occasions 
subverted American calculations and have left American foreign policy in a more vulnerable 
place after the revolution than before. Furthermore, after the revolution, in cases wherein the 
product of the revolution has not matched US intentions or preferences, American intervention 
leaves  a  dark  and hard  to  remove stain  on  the  memories  of  other  state  leaders  who would 
otherwise gladly offer military or economic partnership. 
Instead  of  using  its  influence  to  manipulate  national  publics  and  support  dictators, 
American leaders should use its influence to encourage its friends, allies, and trade partners to 
constantly  reform in  a  way that  marginalizes  the  impact  of  Goldstone’s  assumptions  on the 
drivers of revolutions. If American leaders can develop a track record of success in staving off 
revolution by supporting reforms that target judiciaries, social institutions, economic institutions 
and legislatures, they can encourage wholistic representation of national publics, and can also 
encourage the development of regional stability in the Middle East. 
Finally, American support for and intervention in revolutions has resulted in a terrible 
failure  record.  This  is  partly  due  to  an  attitude  that  responds  to  the  most  salient  drivers  of 
revolution  and  does  not  respond  to  other  more  fundamental  issues  to  national  publics.  If 
American leaders will  reform their  foreign policy to encourage national response to the five 
essential  drivers  of  revolution,  Goldstone’s  assumptions,  American  priorities  may  be  served 
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better. In this way, producing a simplified policy that encourages reform and the production of 
good governance will allow for a greater level of success when choosing to intervene to support 
a revolution or an embattled foreign leader. 
Implications for Academia
The study of revolutions in the International Relations discipline has been broad, and 
there is more known today regarding the nature of revolutions than any other time in modern 
academia.  Moreover,  the  unfortunate  abundance  of  modern  cases  of  both  successful  and 
unsuccessful revolution provide a treasure trove of testable cases to which new theories and 
policies can be applied. The cases surveyed in this work provide a new frontier of academic 
study of revolutions,  and provide the opportunity to test  new theories on a number of cases 
across  time,  including  the  Color  Revolutions  of  Europe,  and  a  broader  set  of  Arab  Spring 
revolutions,  among  others.  This  is  centrally  important  because  revolutions  are  impactful  to 
international order and the ability of peripheral states, including the US, to attain their goals in 
the  international  arena.  Accordingly,  these  hypotheses  of  this  work should  be  reworked and 
reapplied to other cases of revolution in an attempt to qualify and push forward its assertions. So 
doing will allow for a clearer understanding of how revolutions happen and will allow for the 
development of new theories which allow for better prediction of revolutionary violence and for 
the  development  of  response  measures  which  promise  to  lessen  the  instability  wrought  by 
revolutionary violence, and the lives that are taken by it.
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3.7 Alternatives & Further Considerations
 Some of the surveyed cases are plagued with the proverbial chicken or egg issue. Did 
American leaders decide not to support leaders in power because they saw that revolution was 
going to be successful, or was the revolution successful because American leaders chose not to 
intervene? Obviously, in the course of this study, I have supported the notion that it is the case 
that they fail, in part, because of the lack of American intervention. I support this notion because 
the posturing which resulted in the conclusive American policy to most of the states which later 
experienced revolution was present even prior to obvious signs of revolt. Despite this precaution, 
it could be the case that American leaders foresaw the events which led to revolution, and 
determined to respond to the threat of revolution with the observable policies that this study 
assesses.  
 Foreign aid is a complex, nuanced, and frequently changing measure. A number of 
different measures exist, some of which include only economic or military aid, and some of 
which predate the declassification of previously clandestine allocations. For this reason, and 
because covert budget allocations are unavailable to be analyzed, this project is only as good or 
as accurate as the data on which it is based. Future clarifications of this work should again go 
through the painstaking work of scrubbing the thousands of lines of US budget allocations for 
the last 50 years, and verify that the conclusions reached are indeed valid and in keeping with the 
data. 
It is not clear at this point whether the observed impacts by American intervention on the 
sovereign affairs of Middle Eastern states are due to the impact of American strategic superiority 
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or if they are a product of America’s influence as a global hegemon. In the future, this project 
could be retested on other cases wherein hegemons intervened in revolutions, to assess whether 
this is a trend seen across time, or a development of the modern geopolitical world. A future 
study will apply the same analytical framework to other cases of revolution in order to further 
test this study’s findings more heavily. Optimal cases include the Color Revolutions in Europe 
throughout  the  early  2000s,  and  a  larger  proportion  of  revolutions  in  the  Arab  Spring. 
Furthermore, it would be beneficial to identify whether these same factors are as influential in 
cases of coups. While revolutions and the violence that they produce are greatly impactful to 
individuals and communities around the world, more must be known regarding how they happen, 
and what can alter their course once national publics have determined to revolt. 
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